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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the popular yé-yé phenomenon and its role in articulating a vision of
modern France in the aftermath of decolonization. Yé-yé, a teen-oriented and music-based
popular culture that flourished from roughly 1962-1966, was in a unique position to define what
it meant to be young in 1960s France. I argue that the yé-yé popular culture, through its
definition of youth, provided an important cultural channel through which to articulate a modern
French identity after the Algerian War (1954-1962). Using a combination of advertisements,
articles, and sanitized depictions of teenage pop singers, the yé-yé popular culture constructed an
idealized vision of adolescence that coupled a technologically-savvy and consumer-oriented
outlook with a distinctly conservative, apolitical, and inclusive social stance. It reflected France’s
reorientation toward a particular technological and consumer modernity while simultaneously
serving to obscure France’s recent colonial past and the dubious legacy of imperialism.
To contextualize yé-yé, this thesis begins by examining the blousons noirs (black jackets)
and the societal anxieties that surrounded them in the early Fifth Republic (1958-1962). By
tracking the abrupt shift from the blousons noirs to yé-yé in predominant media representations
of youth, this thesis provides a unique vantage point with which to interpret dominant discourses
of the Gaullist Fifth Republic and its attempt to reinvent France into a modernized and
decolonized consumer republic. As the work suggests, it was not a coincidence that the
optimistic yé-yé youth, unburdened by the tribulations of France’s recent past, appeared in full
force within months following the recognition of Algerian independence in 1962.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1963, the commercial radio station Europe 1 invited young people from all
over France to partake in a free outdoor concert held in the nation’s capital, Paris. The event
celebrated the one-year anniversary of the popular teen-oriented music magazine, Salut les
copains. The magazine’s founders, Daniel Filipacchi and Frank Ténot, hoped for a turnout of
30,000 attendees. Instead, exceeding even their wildest expectations, some 150,000 young
people crammed into the Place de la Nation, overflowing into adjoining streets. They came from
all over, from nearby Parisian neighborhoods to far away provinces. Some of the fans, eagerly
seeking a better view of the stage, climbed trees and scaled streetlamps in the square. The
entertainment for the evening included France’s most popular young musical performers,
including Sylvie Vartan, Frank Alamo, Richard Anthony, and the Chats Sauvages. Headlining,
of course, was the ever-popular idole des jeunes, Johnny Hallyday. The “Night of the Nation,” as
it was later called, quickly acquired mythic status; it was, up to that point, the largest concert in
the history of popular music.1
Writing subsequently in the daily newspaper Le Monde, the sociologist and public
intellectual Edgar Morin offered an analysis of what manifested on that summer evening. For
Morin, the concert displayed the emergence of a new classe d’âge defined by a common set of
sensibilities, a distinct parlance, a collective worldview, and, perhaps most importantly, a shared
sense of youth. What unified these teenagers, he noted, was a pervasive popular culture that had

Jacques Barsamian and François Jouffra, L’âge d’or du Yéyé: Le rock, le twist, et la variété française des
années 60 (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1984), 141-142; David L. Looseley, Popular Music in Contemporary France:
Authenticity, Politics, Debate (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 29.
1
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already supplied them with a potent mixture of “myths, heroes, and models.”2 Drawing from the
common vocal refrain “yeah, yeah” heard in many American songs from the period (of which the
phonetic spelling in French was “yé, yé”), he termed the nascent phenomenon yé-yé. Morin
argued that this popular culture, made possible by the rise of mass culture and mass
communications, had created a “new adolescent class” that had implications for French society at
large.3
This thesis focuses on the yé-yé phenomenon that gained widespread popularity in 1960s
France. As Morin made clear, “youth” figured prominently as a discursive category in the mass
media and among influential social scientists, educators, politicians, and social commentators.
Given its ubiquity during the period, the yé-yé popular culture was in a unique position to define
what it meant to be young in 1960s France. It was not the only discursive portrait of youth during
the mid-1960s, but it was arguably the most visible. I argue that the yé-yé phenomenon, in its
definition of adolescence, provided an important cultural channel through which to imagine and
articulate a modern French identity in the Gaullist Fifth Republic. Through its marrying of a
certain technological and consumer modernity with an apolitical and traditional social outlook,
the idealized yé-yé teenager announced the arrival of a unified, prosperous, and forward-looking
modern France unburdened by its recent past.
This was in stark contrast to an earlier representation of youth, the blousons noirs (black
jackets), which, when discussed in the media, evoked fears of working-class juvenile
delinquency and “Americanization.” The wholesome yé-yé youth, as defined in the media, was

Edgar Morin, “Salut les copains: Une nouvelle classe d’âge,” Le Monde, July 6, 1963, 11. Unless
otherwise noted, all translations from the original French are by the author.
3
Edgar Morin, “Salut les copains: Le ‘yé-yé,’” Le Monde, July 7-8, 1963, 12.
2
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created in part to assuage societal fears of the earlier blousons noirs. To track the abrupt shift
from blousons noirs to yé-yé therefore offers a unique point of focus with which to chart
France’s changing attitude regarding modernization and American-style mass consumerism in
the wake of the Algerian War (1954-1962).
It is my contention that these discursive portraits of youth, the blousons noirs and the yéyé, can be read, and that, to do so is to shed light on the major anxieties and aspirations that
defined a particular moment in French history.4 My main goals are twofold. First, I provide a
much-needed historical contextualization of the yé-yé popular culture, from its origins in the era
of the blousons noirs to its eventual end amid the student protests of May 1968, grounding its
significance in larger changes during the period. Second, I aim to use yé-yé as a heretofore
unlikely lens to investigate the way France navigated changing socio-cultural values and identity
during modernization, decolonization, and the Cold War. By using this lens, I am able to
interpret dominant discourses of the Gaullist Fifth Republic and to assess how many influential
voices imagined France’s reinvention into a decolonized consumer republic.
But what was yé-yé? It was foremost a popular culture, one made possible by the advent
of mass society in the twentieth century.5 As a popular culture, yé-yé primarily entailed music

4
As my approach to this topic makes clear, I treat both the blousons noirs and yé-yé as phenomena that
existed primarily in discourse. That is not to suggest that there were no teenagers who fit the description of the
typical blousons noirs or copains of yé-yé. It was nevertheless the mass media that remained throughout the period
the primary influence in defining youth. The question of how actual young people received (and possibly resisted or
modified) this image is equally worthy of research. I do not possess the sources to permit me to address how
teenagers responded to the media discourse that sought to speak on their behalf. As such, my focus remains on the
dominant representations of youth deployed by advertisers, journalists, the music industry, and others.
5
Mass society entailed the rise of mass communications (made possible by the rapid expansion of radio,
film, print media, advertisements, and eventually television), mass culture (made possible by mass production and
standardization), and mass consumption (implying the widespread availability of commodities and the general
ability of the population to purchase them). On popular culture, see Raymond F. Betts with Lyz Bly, A History of
Popular Culture: More of Everything, Faster and Brighter, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013); on French
popular culture, see Hugh Dauncey, ed., French Popular Culture: An Introduction (London: Arnold, 2003).
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and music-related print media. It included innumerable musical performers, some enduring and
many forgettable, who released new records at a dizzying pace. Its sounds and imagery were
found on radio, television, and film. It spurred the creation of numerous periodicals and
publications. At its height, yé-yé drew the attention of fashion designers and provided a
marketing edge for a seemingly infinite number of commodities, from bubblegum and hairspray
to turntables and automobiles. Its main propagators were savvy commercial interests, including
record companies and publishing houses, and its most influential voices were journalists,
advertisers, and, most importantly, the young singers. It was different from other prominent
popular culture from the period – such as comic strips like Astérix or New Wave films like Les
Quatre Cents Coups (The 400 Blows), for instance – in that it endeavored to be allencompassing, to speak on behalf of young people.6
By critically analyzing the yé-yé phenomenon, this thesis hopes to contribute to the larger
historiography on France’s postwar “modernization,” a term that is admittedly vague, even
problematic, but which nevertheless provides a common framework through which to understand
change in the decades following World War II.7 The roots of this modernization lay in the
wartime experience of Nazi occupation and Vichy collaborationism; as the narrative goes,
postwar leaders, desiring to look to the future rather than contemplate the recent past, rejected
the political and economic institutions that had so clearly failed to protect France in its time of
need and instead made deliberate efforts to transform the nation along economic, technological,
On Astérix, see Penelope E. Brown, A Critical History of French Children’s Literature: Volume Two,
1830-Present (New York: Routledge, 2008); on New Wave cinema, see Richard Neupert, A History of the French
New Wave Cinema, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007).
7
For a critique of the term “modernization” as a framework for analysis, see Dean C. Tipps,
“Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 15, no. 2 (Mar., 1973): 199-226.
6
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political, and socio-cultural lines. A large body of literature points to the myriad changes in
France from the 1940s to the 1960s.8 Some works, adopting the language of postwar technocrats,
use modernization to interpret change during the period.9 Others address the topic more subtly,
considering the process of postwar reinvention while leaving modernization in the background.10
Taken together these works point to a postwar France that took deliberate and relatively swift
actions to transform itself on economic and material levels and, perhaps simultaneously or as a
consequence, on social and cultural levels as well.

8
Or, perhaps more precisely, the period from 1946 to 1975, what economist Jean Fourastié deemed the
trente glorieuses (the “Thirty Glorious Years”). He dubbed it such because of the near 30-year span of unceasing
and unprecedented economic growth during the period. Fourastié’s now-seminal 1979 publication, which inspected
the drivers of economic growth and social change during the period (demographic growth, industrial and corporate
investment, rising wages, and changing habits of consumption and leisure, among others), has since provided a
familiar, if potentially problematic, periodization for subsequent scholars. See Jean Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses
ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 1979). Historians have recently begun to critically
reconsider the period in numerous ways. For a recent critique of this periodization, see Rémy Pawin, “Retour sur les
‘Trente Glorieuses’ et la périodisation du second XXe siècle,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine 60, no. 1
(Jan-Mar 2013): 155-175. For a look at the negative, oft-neglected aspects of France’s postwar economic growth,
see Céline Pessis, Sezin Topçu, and Christophe Bonneuil, eds., Une autre histoire des « Trente Glorieuses »:
Modernisation, contestations, et pollutions dans la France d’après-guerre (Paris: Découverte, 2013).
9
Gabrielle Hecht points to the role of nuclear technology in reorienting national identity. See Gabrielle
Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998). Rosemary Wakeman examines the reinvention of Toulouse, from a decrepit provincial city into a
modernized technological hub during the postwar period. See Rosemary Wakeman, Modernizing the Provincial
City: Toulouse, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). For Steven Zdatny, modernization
was felt through changing perceptions of cleanliness. See Steven Zdatny, “The French Hygiene Offensive of the
1950s: A Critical Moment in the History of Manners,” Journal of Modern History 84, no. 4 (December 2012): 897932. Rebecca Pulju, meanwhile, provides a much needed analysis of women’s role, as consumers for the nation, in
French modernization. See Rebecca J. Pulju, Women and Mass Consumer Society in Postwar France (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011). Others frame French modernization in the context of Americanization and
Franco-American relations. See for instance Christopher Endy, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Brian Angus McKenzie, Remaking France:
Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
10
The works that consider postwar French culture and intellectualism affirm the same societal impetus for
change that color works on France’s various modernizing processes. Herman Lebovics for instance considers how
President de Gaulle’s Minister of Culture, André Malraux, deployed France’s artistic legacy as a means to assert
international prestige and foster national unity. See Herman Lebovics, Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malraux and the
Reinvention of French Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Tamara Chaplin considers how in the
postwar period, France, by televising its public philosophers, coupled its humanistic and intellectual traditions with
its new modernizing tendencies to assert a new national identity. See Tamara Chaplin, Turning on the Mind: French
Philosophers on Television (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

5

One topic, however, remains conspicuously absent from the general narrative of France’s
modernization: the Algerian War. Much of the work on modernization tends to downplay or
ignore the central importance of decolonization and the Algerian War in understanding postwar
France in general and the early Fifth Republic in particular. This remains true despite the
conflict’s indelible impact on the era, including most obviously the suspect origins of the Fifth
Republic in 1958. By contrast, I aim to integrate, to the extent possible, the war and its
consequences into my interpretation of France’s process of reinvention along technocratic,
corporate, and consumerist lines. In this attempt, Kristin Ross’ 1995 monograph Fast Cars,
Clean Bodies looms large on my interpretation. Using an eclectic assortment of literary, film,
intellectual, and periodical sources, Ross argues that between roughly 1955 and 1965, France
underwent a cultural shift as a consequence of the twin processes of decolonization and
modernization.11 It was at that specific historical juncture, she maintains, that an “interior
colonialism” on the level of the everyday replaced the colonial project of old. In other words,
precisely at the moment France relinquished imperial control over subject peoples, a system of
advanced consumer capitalism imposed its control over the rhythms and practices of daily life.
Treating “French modernization as an event,” Ross explores the process by which the logic of
modernization integrated into everyday life and gave new meaning to the automobile, hygienic
products, and the middle-class family unit.12 Reading her work raises the question: was a similar
cultural logic regarding modernization reflected elsewhere? Influenced by Ross’ approach, my

11

Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture
(Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1995).
12
Ibid., 4.
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research aims to assess the extent to which teen-oriented popular culture signaled the
rationalization of a France transformed by economic and socio-cultural modernization.
Interestingly, it was, according to Ross, the process of modernization that made it
possible to envision a neat and orderly separation between metropolitan France and its former
empire once colonialism “came to an abrupt end, cleanly, in 1962.”13 By tracking the sudden
national interest in hygiene in the 1950s, Ross argues that it provided a metaphorical means to
both “cleanse” and “purify” the nation following the Vichy collaborationism of World War II.
She also finds that the same discourses of cleanliness – which encouraged household efficiency
and strove to erase all stains – simultaneously operated to justify the systematized use of torture
tactics in Algeria by erasing “the moral sense of trace (the mark of guilt, of wrongdoing).”14
Through a provocative discursive analysis, Ross provides a framework to understand how the
process of modernization served to erase, or at least subordinate, France’s colonial past. Building
on this conclusion, albeit in a different domain, I consider how yé-yé, very much a product of
France’s mass consumer modernity, contributed to a modernized France “cleansed” of its
imperial legacy.
Additionally, over the past two decades, the topic of “youth” has become increasingly
commonplace in the historiography of modern France and Europe. Social historians have turned
their attention to youth organizations and student protest.15 Others have considered the advent of

13

Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 118.
15
Some relevant examples of this approach include Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth,
eds., Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960-1980 (New York: Berghahn,
2011); Gerd Rainer-Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007); and, most recently, Robert Gildea, James Mark, Anette Warring, eds., Europe’s
1968: Voice of Revolt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
14
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“youth culture,” often in a transnational or comparative setting.16 These works provide muchneeded agency to young people in the interpretation of socio-cultural and political change during
the postwar era. More relevant to my research, historians have also begun to probe the sociallyconstructed category of youth, whether in media representations or in societal discourse. These
historians use the topic of “youth” as a means through which to investigate change during the
postwar period and as a lens onto the many preoccupations, anxieties, and aspirations of the
era.17 Susan Weiner, in her 2001 work Enfants Terribles, considers prominent media
representations of young girls in postwar France and how they corresponded to a society seeking
to define its national identity in the aftermath of World War II and amid national and
international change.18 More recently, Richard Ivan Jobs, in the 2007 work Riding the New
Wave, examines how postwar French society used the category of youth to envision national
renewal during the Fourth Republic.19
While the topics of youth and youth culture have become increasingly attractive areas of
study, critical analyses of the yé-yé popular culture and its representation of youth, the copain,
remain limited. Several French music journalists provide thorough accounts of the musical

16

See Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.
1958-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and, more recently, the edited collection Axel Schildt and
Detlef Siegfried, eds., Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006).
17
Numerous scholars have taken this approach in recent studies. See, for instance, Lindsay Sarah Krasnoff,
“Goals and Dreams: The Quest to Create Elite Youth Athletes in France, 1958-92” (Phd diss., City University of
New York, 2009); Gilian Glaes, “Gender and the French Ski Industry, 1946-1960,” in Proceedings of the Western
Society for French History 37 (2009); and Sharon Elise Cline, “Feminité à la Française: Femininity, Social Change,
and French National Identity, 1945-1970” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008).
18
Susan Weiner, Enfants Terribles: Youth and Femininity in the Mass Media in France, 1945-1968
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
19
Richard Ivan Jobs, Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World
War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
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phenomenon.20 Within the French academy, historians, more focused on detailing the experience
of actual young people from the period, tend to treat yé-yé as one of many factors that shaped the
adolescent experience in the 1960s.21 Scholars like David Looseley analyze yé-yé to consider
how Anglo-American musical styles gained cultural legitimacy within French popular music.22
Chris Tinker has written much about yé-yé, but his focus remains largely confined to the most
popular publication of the era, Salut les copains.23 Jonathyne Briggs, using a musicological
approach, places yé-yé into a changing landscape of French popular music that he argues served
to provide fleeting social solidarities in an otherwise changing and fragmenting postwar
society.24 Providing a much-needed gender analysis of the popular culture, his more recent work
considers how the female singers of yé-yé addressed prevailing gender and sexual norms through
their music and appearance.25
Unlike scholars like Looseley, who deemed yé-yé both “vacuous and embarrassingly
inauthentic” as well as a “colonised music that eternally misses the point,” my interest is not to

See Barsamian and Jouffra, L’âge d’or du Yéyé; for a more general treatment, see Frédéric Quinonero,
Les années 60: Rêves et Révolutions (Paris: Carpentier, 2009).
21
See Anne-Marie Sohn, Age tendre et tête de bois: Histoire des jeunes des années 1960 (Paris: Hachette,
2001); and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les baby-boomers: Une génération, 1945-1969 (Paris: Fayard, 2003).
22
Looseley, Popular Music in Contemporary France.
23
His research provides a discursive analysis of the magazine Salut les copains to shed light on the way it
shaped the meaning of adolescence in 1960s and 1970s France, as well as how it influenced social norms. See Chris
Tinker, “Shaping Youth in Salut les copains,” Modern and Contemporary France 15, no. 3 (August 2007): 293-308;
and Chris Tinker, Mixed Messages: Youth Magazine Discourse and Sociocultural Shifts in Salut les copains (19621976) (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010).
24
Jonathyne Briggs, “Anarchie en France: Hypermodernity and French Popular Music, 1958-1981” (PhD
diss., Emory University, 2006). A more recent work, published too recently to be used in this thesis, is Jonathyne
Briggs, Sounds French: Globalization, Cultural Communities, and Pop Music in France, 1958-1980 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015).
25
In the article, Briggs argues that the “long sexual revolution” had a distinctly gendered dimension and
that, unlike male performers who were able to use music to question and alter sexual norms, female performers
needed to uphold conservative social mores. See Jonathyne Briggs, “Sex and the Girl’s Single: French Popular
Music and the Long Sexual Revolution of the 1960s,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 21, no 3 (September
2012): 523-547.
20
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track the path American-influenced popular music took to cultural authenticity in France.26 It is
true that yé-yé never received the critical praise of other genres and it remained, both during its
span and after, the fodder of serious music critics. Acknowledging this, however, does little to
explain why the popular culture was able to reach such popularity and resonate with so many.
My research strives to assess the yé-yé’s significance beyond its musical contributions, seeing it
as a cultural phenomenon attuned to its unique historical moment. Building on Kristen Ross’
research, this thesis suggests that the timing of yé-yé’s swift ascent, coming in the months
following the end of the Algerian War, was not coincidental. The idealized yé-yé youth
symbolized a generation, born after the Second World War and too young to be culpable for the
atrocities committed during the Algerian War, untarnished by the recent past. It provided, as a
vital signifier of youth, a convenient vessel with which to project the hopes and aspirations of a
reinvented nation.
My research relies on a number of primary sources drawn from the mass media of the
period. They come from, to use Herrick Chapman’s phrase, the usual “alchemists of national
identity”: journalists, writers, filmmakers, advertisers, celebrities, social scientists, educators,
politicians, and other vocal social commentators.27 I have relied on some sources more heavily
than others, depending on their availability. Mass-print magazines meant for teenagers, like the
popular Salut les copains, form the backbone of my research, though they are supplemented and
corroborated to the extent possible by a number of other sources including books, government
pamphlets, films, newspapers, women’s and entertainment magazines, television programs,
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photographs, speeches, song lyrics, and album covers. In the popular teen-oriented magazines of
the era, a startling number of articles, editorials, questionnaires, advertisements, and advice
columns defined what it meant to be young in 1960s France.
At the same time, famous teenage singers, or “teen idols” as they were called, who often
served as the focus of the magazines, offered a mythic (and highly mediated) depiction of
adolescence that encouraged emulation. Throughout this study, these stars’ attitudes, opinions,
and actions, as well as their representation in the media, provide much of the evidence for my
argument. Guided by a recent work on stardom in postwar France, I operate on the belief that
“the ‘stars’ of a given historical period or moment capture their era for us in a range of ways: that
the preoccupations, values, conflicts, and contradictions of a particular culture … are vividly
expressed through its celebrities.”28 Admittedly, the voices captured here, whether journalists or
teenage singers, did not necessarily reflect the whole of France. They were nevertheless in the
privileged position to offer their interpretation of the country’s system of values, its cultural
priorities and imperatives, and its identity. In doing so, they provided a particular vision that both
constructed and reflected larger societal desires prevalent in the Gaullist Fifth Republic.
This thesis captures France at a significant moment in history, one shaped by wars of
decolonization, concerted social and economic change, and an international political climate
tempered by the Cold War and America’s dominant position in the West. At the forefront was
the Algerian War, which, since 1954, had embroiled France in a bloody fight to quell Algerian
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nationalism and preserve the centerpiece of its colonial empire.29 It was a “dirty war,” one that
saw the French army’s widespread use of torture and terror tactics, exposing the moral
bankruptcy of France’s fabled Civilizing Mission. At the same time, it was a “war without a
name,” to use John Talbott’s phrase, as an entire cloud of obfuscation formed to deny the French
public a clear portrait of the war.30 A number of euphemisms – alternating between the Algerian
“problem,” the Algerian “dispute,” or, most commonly, the Algerian “events” – emerged to
define the conflict; in official propaganda, meanwhile, the soldiers’ mission was not one of
warfare, but rather “pacification.”31 In the final years of the bitter conflict, violence and terrorism
became increasingly common on both sides of the Mediterranean. Within months of the war’s
conclusion in 1962, some 900,000 European settlers, fearing retribution, fled the newly
independent Algeria, most settling in France, a “homeland” they had never known. Meanwhile,
for a generation of young recruits, over two million in all, the conflict, which implicated them in
acts of torture and abuse, signaled the loss of both youth and innocence.32
By 1958, the political situation had deteriorated to the extent that the feeble Fourth
Republic (1946-1958) had lost support of Algeria’s white settler population. It had also lost
authority over the French military, which threatened to topple the government and install a leader
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of its choosing rather than suffer another humiliating loss (following World War II, the
Indochina War, and the Suez Crisis) at the hands of irresolute politicians. A divided France,
under threat of military coup and possible civil war, turned to the hero of World War II, Charles
de Gaulle, who, in the moment of crisis, appeared to be the lone figure capable of appeasing both
the populace and the military, while also bringing resolution to the Algerian War.33 His return
spelled the death knell of the Fourth Republic, and, with it, the founding of the Fifth Republic.
The tone of government underwent an important change in this shift from the Fourth to the Fifth
Republics; if the National Assembly and its numerous, fractious party rivalries dominated
political life in the Fourth Republic, the early Fifth Republic’s focus centered on the powerful
executive branch. When coupled with resounding electoral success for the Gaullists in the
National Assembly, this new political dynamic allowed de Gaulle and his paternalistic brand of
conservatism to dominate political (and social) discourse for the better part of a decade.34
As the country confronted the loss of its empire, many vocal critics claimed that France
faced a veritable “colonization” of its own thanks to the influx of American cultural products,
business investment, and tourists (to say nothing of the United States’ political and military
influence at the height of the Cold War). It exacerbated existing fears about France’s loss of
prestige and its declining influence on the world stage.35
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Chapter one, by focusing on the era of the blousons noirs, seeks to frame societal concern
about juvenile delinquency in relation to a larger historical context. During the early Fifth
Republic, from roughly 1958 to 1962, the blousons noirs captured the attention of both popular
and academic writers. A pejorative term from the start, it conjured images, often drawn from
American teen cinema, of young troublemakers outfitted in black leather jackets and blue jeans.
Observers routinely attached a working-class label to the blousons noirs. In one sense, “working
class” referred to the marginalized socio-economic background of the young delinquents. More
often than not, though, the label was purely perceptional, whereby “working-class culture”
suggested something subversive, foreign, and perennially at odds with the dominant culture,
particularly as it applied to the perceived corruption of middle-class youths. I argue that the
sudden spike in national concern over juvenile delinquency must be historicized. As the chapter
demonstrates, discussion about the working-class blousons noirs, as part of a larger debate about
juvenile delinquency, frequently corresponded to societal ambivalence about a changing nation
beset by the Algerian War, modernization, and Americanization.
By the mid-1960s, with the collapse of the French Empire, the Gaullist state searched for
new means to express national identity and to recoup national self-esteem. Industrial and
technological modernization, which France’s political and technocratic elite had pursued since
the end of World War II, took on new importance, becoming a key element in the reassertion and
re-articulation of French prestige.36 At the same time, the rise of American-style mass
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consumerism no longer provoked insecurity. Instead, when coupled with de Gaulle’s brand of
nationalism, it became a measure of the ever-increasing living standard of French citizens and of
the economic vitality of the new French Republic. The “modern” France of the mid-1960s thus
projected the image of a unified, forward-looking, and confident nation. The recent past, whether
the near civil war of World War II or the Algerian quagmire, was forgotten.
Together, chapters two and three consider the ways in which the yé-yé popular culture
contributed to the society-wide acceptance of a particular definition of “modern” France. Chapter
two explores how the popular culture advanced an image of adolescence that corresponded to the
broad national imperatives of modernization. In doing so, it shed the supposedly working-class
connotations of the blousons noirs by placing yé-yé squarely within the value system of the
newly urban, educated, and technocratic middle class of the era. The chapter also considers how
the popular culture served to envision a new France fully disentangled from its colonial legacy.
Chapter three examines the way that the yé-yé popular culture integrated an ideology of mass
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consumerism into the fabric of everyday life.37 Looking at two practical (and gendered)
examples – the automobile and ready-to-wear fashion – the chapter studies how both consumer
commodities became central to the definition of modern adolescence and how notions of taste,
success, happiness, and, ultimately, national identity were reoriented in the process.
As chapters two and three suggest, the yé-yé popular culture articulated a vision of youth
that was unifying, conservative, and stable. In many ways, though, its image of stability masked
a rapidly changing society. Particularly among a generation of postwar youths, rising affluence
and increasing independence led to a liberalization of attitudes towards sexuality. Chapter four
considers the construction of femininity in the yé-yé phenomenon. As the chapter argues, against
the backdrop of an emergent sexual revolution, the yé-yé popular culture attempted to manage
changing attitudes and social mores by affirming the primacy of a femininity grounded in the
traditional framework of marriage, motherhood, and domesticity.

For clarification, it is necessary to differentiate “consumer society” from “mass consumer society.” The
former is generally understood to have emerged in the West during the latter half of the nineteenth century. It
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from lower classes. Consumer society was directly related to increased productive capabilities made possible by the
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Finally, the epilogue tracks the demise of the once-popular yé-yé phenomenon in the late
1960s. It explains why the copain construct of youth that once resonated no longer matched the
attitudes and aspirations of French youth. Each of the chapters, in one way or another, addresses
what many wanted France to be or to become. In most cases, they represented societal aspiration
over reality. They nevertheless tell us something about how influential voices within French
society sought to define both youth and nation in 1960s France.
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CHAPTER 1: DEFINING TEENAGE CONSUMPTION IN THE ERA OF
THE BLOUSONS NOIRS, 1958-1962
On a cool evening in late February 1961, a strange spectacle began to materialize on the
outskirts of Paris. Along the outer limits of the Fifteenth Arrondissement, roughly five thousand
teenagers gathered, waiting impatiently for the night to commence. For onlookers, the sight was
disconcerting: a horde of young people, the majority of which were males, outfitted in
questionable attire and looking ominous. Many of the young men wore blue jeans, leather
jackets, and ruffled caps – the attire linked to the blousons noirs in the preceding years. Their site
of congregation was the Palais des Sports, a fitting location for the event. The venue, a futuristic
structure built the year prior, offered an ideal setting for a phenomenon without precedent: the
first rock and roll festival on French soil. Rowdy teenagers flooded the stadium, intent on
hearing some of the most celebrated names in French rock and roll play loud and raucous music.
The list of performers included, among others, Frankie Jordan, the Chaussettes Noires, and
Johnny Hallyday. The festival proved fertile ground for controversy. By the end of the evening, a
number of brawls ensued and approximately fifty stadium chairs were ripped from the floor. At
one point during the concert, the police needed to intervene to bolster stadium security. When it
was all said and done, a handful of teenagers ended up in the hospital as a result of the unruly
crowd.1
Michèle Manceaux, a journalist for the weekly news magazine L’Express, covered the
concert. Her article recounted the evening in lurid detail. She spoke for many who remained
ambivalent about the uncertain trends attracting French youth and who worried about the
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implications for France’s future. Upon witnessing the incomprehensible music and the
inexplicable rituals of the audience, she wondered “what savage tribe could celebrate a cult as
pagan, as vacuous” as the spectacle that befell the Palais des Sports.2 “Nevertheless,” she
concluded despite her disbelief, “this is really Paris, and this is French youth.”3 In the following
weeks, dismayed readers wrote to L’Express to voice their disapproval of Manceaux’s
assessment of French youth. Many took issue with Manceaux’s conclusion that the apparent
debauchery of the evening reflected the “true” youth of France. As one reader wrote:
No, madam, this is not Paris and still less the French youth, it is the underbelly
of the French youth and one must not confuse the two. The true French youth
– one doesn’t find them at the Palais des Sports shouting and swaying,
intentionally dressed in an idiotic and extravagant way (without knowing
why). No … one finds the true French youth in schools, workshops, factories,
colleges, and also … in Algeria.4
The reader’s impassioned letter, in its effort to disassociate the image of France’s youth from
supposed unsavory elements in attendance at the Palais des Sports, echoed a larger societal
preoccupation in the early years of the French Fifth Republic.
The rise of rock and roll in France occurred at an important junction in the nation’s
history. Political change, marked most obviously by the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958,
accompanied the dramatic, and often difficult, processes of modernization and decolonization.
As the country attempted to navigate these transformations, it faced the ever-present economic,
cultural, and political influence of the United States within the Cold War. In the early Fifth
Republic, anxieties about uncertain social and cultural change, voiced by a diversity of
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commentators, were often channeled into discussions about the blousons noirs as part of a larger
dialogue regarding juvenile delinquency. In particular, social commentators – both academic and
popular writers – used the blousons noirs as a vehicle to question the societal impact of France’s
thrust towards modernization and its simultaneous war in Algeria. At the same time, the image of
the blousons noirs – working-class gangs of teenagers who consumed American popular culture
– provided fodder for critics to lament the cultural and economic influence of the United States
and to fret France’s drift toward American-style mass consumer society.
The Blousons Noirs and Juvenile Delinquency in the Early Fifth Republic
By the end of the 1950s, the French public was swept up in an intense, if ultimately shortlived, furor over the blousons noirs. Over a span of nearly 10 years, from roughly 1957 to 1965,
writers of all persuasions devoted countless pages to them in everything from entertainment
magazines to social-scientific studies.5 During the period, brooding teenage males could be
spotted loitering around Paris cinemas, cafés, and metro stations. In the public imagination, they
were working-class gangs of young men (joined by the occasional wayward adolescent female)
outfitted in blue jeans, boots, leather jackets, t-shirts, and slick pompadour hairstyles. The
summer of 1959 marked the height of the controversy over the blousons noirs. The media
declared it the “summer of the blousons noirs” following an uptick of public disturbances and
hooliganism in which Paris police apprehended over five hundred adolescents for a variety of
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minor offenses. The climax came on July 22, 1959, when two rival gangs clashed in the Square
Saint-Lambert in the Fifteenth Arrondissement of the French capital. Beyond ruining the square’s
topiary and seating, the scuffle caused little serious damage. It nevertheless culminated in
twenty-seven arrests and an official response from the Paris Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon.6
The mass media played a pivotal role in exaggerating and sensationalizing fears about the
teenage gang culture sweeping across France. Newspapers and magazines promptly seized
opportunities to inflate veritable, if nevertheless minor, instances of hooliganism into larger
alarm about the blousons noirs. Some journalists went so far as to persuade adolescents outfitted
in leather jackets to stage mock scuffles for the benefit of newspaper photographs. In other
instances, news journals, faced with the legal dilemma of showcasing pictures of minors in print
media, simply pulled images from American films like Rebel without a Cause to supplement
their stories about teenage delinquent gangs.7 These measures served to distort and exaggerate
facts in order to create perceptions of juvenile delinquency among French youth. Nevertheless, a
slew of works by public intellectuals and social scientists appeared simultaneously. Echoing
similar concern, if under the guise of scientific and educational expertise, these publications lent
the debate over the blousons noirs an air of much-needed credibility.8
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France’s fixation on juvenile delinquency in the 1950s mirrored, and in many ways was
informed by, similar trends in other industrialized nations.9 Despite the heightened interest,
though, the issue of juvenile delinquency was hardly new. As Sarah Fishman notes, from the
early nineteenth century onward, France developed an evolving juvenile justice system and legal
framework for minors that corresponded to changing understandings of childhood, crime,
degeneracy, and recuperation.10 In the immediate postwar period, the same impulses that guided
earlier efforts colored initiatives to reeducate so-called degenerate youths. Fears about the
deleterious effects of World War II and the German occupation of France motivated reform of
the juvenile justice system that prioritized rehabilitation over punishment in the face of rising
instances of youth criminality.11 From the early nineteenth century to the postwar period,
juvenile delinquency and the future of France’s youth was a recurring problem, one that had
particular resonance during times of perceived crisis and change.
In the public imagination, cities had long been the sites of most cases of juvenile
delinquency and adolescent criminality.12 The perception in the late 1950s was no different, as
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the blousons noirs were conceived primarily as an urban phenomenon. At the same time, it was
cities where the societal effects of the Algerian War were most visible. The burst of anxiety over
the blousons noirs coincided with the height of war-related violence in Paris and elsewhere.
While violence had long been an instrument of colonial rule, metropolitan France had been
largely spared the instances of brutality employed in territories abroad. Even with the Algerian
War, raging since 1954, the mainland remained mostly unscathed. This situation changed from
1958 onward, as bloody clashes between French forces and Algerian nationalists spilled over
into France’s largest cities.13 The climax of violence came on October 17, 1961, when police
officers brutally dispersed a peaceful public demonstration of Algerians, killing scores of
demonstrators. The police murdered an estimated two hundred persons, many in the heart of
Paris, on the night of the demonstration and in the days following.14
Additionally, as the war crawled toward an eventual denouement, French cities became
hotspots for terrorist acts carried out by the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS), a fascist
paramilitary group comprised of disgruntled military leaders, colonists, and far-right politicians
intent on preserving, through all means necessary, French Algeria. The group, formed in 1961,
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directed attacks and assassination attempts toward anyone perceived to be supportive of Algerian
independence. The OAS targeted public figures like the intellectual Jean-Paul Sartre and de
Gaulle’s Minster of Culture, André Malraux. Even the French President was the subject of
repeated assassination attempts. As French relinquishment of Algeria became increasingly likely,
the organization dialed up its attacks. Its choice instruments of terror were plastic explosives;
over the span of two weeks in late January 1962, the OAS carried out forty-eight bombings in
Paris alone.15
Few public voices wanted to acknowledge the effects of this highly visible, war-related
violence on France’s youth. Possibly fearful of the strict censorship in effect during the conflict,
there remained a conspicuous silence on the potential relationship between the “dirty war” and
juvenile delinquency.16 Writing after the conflict in 1962, Emile Copfermann, an influential
social commentator interested in matters of youth development, made the impact clear. He
recognized that the blousons noirs, who possessed “nothing very original” by way of attire and
origin, were nevertheless exposed to a climate markedly different from their counterparts in other
Western countries. He proceeded to describe a youth colored by “seven years of the Algerian
War, murders, [and] daily assassinations.”17 Later in his analysis, Copfermann pondered the
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effect of the conflict on returning soldiers. He feared that it had corrupted a generation of youths.
“The riots of the blousons noirs posed the question of juvenile delinquency,” he wrote,
concluding that these “cases of disobedience called attention to the reality of the war five years
after the opening of hostilities.”18 The war, he found, had led to a “deterioration of the ethical
climate” and a “deprivation of morals” among a generation of young combatants. Copfermann,
in his reflection on the war, remained an outlier, as few specialists proved willing to prompt
reflection on the conflict’s toll on French youth.
France’s cities, ravaged by war-related violence and terrorism, also lent a striking
visibility to the concerted, if often uneven, national efforts to modernize. In this respect, nothing
symbolized the country’s technocratic modernizing aspirations better than the project of urban
construction that brought new, if not always improved, changes to cities and urban areas. The
blousons noirs, and the topic of juvenile delinquency in general, quickly became entangled in
this larger process of reconstruction. As Rosemary Wakeman notes, the imagery of young
hooligans occupying Parisian streets became a symbol of a larger breakdown of urban space
amid France’s effort to swiftly urbanize.19 The reconstitution of urban space referred in particular
to the sweeping construction of publicly-funded housing complexes, many of which were the
rent-controlled apartments known as Habitations à Loyer Modéré (HLM). Leaving 1 in 20
buildings destroyed and a fifth of all buildings damaged, World War II provided the initial
impetus for reconstruction. Over the course of the 1950s, economic change, accompanied by
urbanization, prompted a further housing drive.20 At the beginning of the Second World War,
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France represented the most rural nation in Europe, with almost half of its population living in
small communes and a fourth of its workforce employed in agriculture. With the development of
new industries and, with them, new employment opportunities, French families increasingly left
rural villages in search of work in urban areas. At its height in the 1960s, this “rural exodus”
drove some 100,000 workers per year from the soil to the cities.21
In an effort to accommodate the housing crisis and the migratory patterns accompanying
economic growth, the French state implemented a number of plans and programs aimed at the
construction of ample and affordable urban housing.22 Despite a slow start, the basic goal was
successful; between public and private efforts, there were some 300,000 new housing units
produced per year by the early 1960s. The final result, however, was often a question of quantity
at the expense of quality, leading to the creation of the grands ensembles – large, imposing
blocks of concrete apartment buildings situated on the outer limits of French cities. Many of the
units were often drab, offering their inhabitants few comforts. Compounding the problem, the
apartments, often built along the outskirts of urban areas, regularly lacked sufficient access to
parks, shopping centers, and other spaces for leisure and recreation. Poor transportation options
made searching for and commuting to work equally frustrating.23
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These vast complexes became linked to juvenile delinquency in the early Fifth Republic,
as the image of bored and restless blousons noirs loitering outside of barren apartment buildings
became a useful metaphor for the dreary existence associated with the grands ensembles. At the
time, a class of experts on the subject readily confirmed that the social atmosphere created by
these structures fueled the formation of teenage gangs. Located in the Paris suburb of
Vaucresson, the Centre de Formation et de Recherche de l’Education Surveillée, a research
facility borne out of the social-scientific and technocratic impulses of the 1950s, affected a
massive study on the topic of gang formation in the summer of 1960. The center found that,
more than any other single factor (including scholastic and professional milieus), the quality of
the neighborhood contributed to the creation of youth gangs. The researchers noted that the HLM
housing complexes provided the most favorable conditions for juvenile delinquency. The reasons
were numerous. They pointed to the high population density, the cramped living conditions, and
the lack of recreational areas, noting that gang-related juvenile delinquency was highest among
adolescents “for which the street is the only source of relaxation.”24
The perceived association between the grands ensembles and the blousons noirs was not
limited to researchers. The links also permeated into popular culture. A 1960 film captured the
public perception on the issue. Directed by Marcel Carné, an aging filmmaker in the twilight of
his career, Terrain Vague (Wasteland) focused on a fictional gang of teenage miscreants who
punctuated their boredom with a combination of petty theft and hooliganism. The film’s opening
scene commenced in the somber corridors of a judicial court for minors. A reluctant judge,
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seated before one repeat offender, sentenced the delinquent teen to time in a juvenile detention
center, one final chance, the judge warned, before the youth reached adulthood. As the opening
credits rolled across the screen, the viewer was met with atmospheric and eerie shots of vast
housing complexes – huge, uniform rectangles outlined in the night sky, illuminated only by a
random sprinkling of apartment lights. The scene lingered, showing the delinquent’s dejected
mother ascending the countless flights of stairs, her steps echoing in the cavernous stairwell. The
scene offered a not-so-subtle critique of the “modern” housing units – the sense of alienation and
monotony they engendered – blotted across the French landscape in Paris and elsewhere.25
The plot of Terrain Vague centered on the budding romantic relationship between Dan
(short for Danièle), a boyish female leader of a local gang, and Lucky, a member of the group of
young delinquents. Both fled the gang after its focus shifted from small-scale shoplifting to
organized robbery. In the process, Lucky’s departure sabotaged the planned heist, thus drawing
the gang’s ire and forcing the two into hiding in order to evade their former peers. In searching
for the couple, the gang began to hassle one of the youngest gang members, Babar, who lived in
the same HLM as Dan and thus represented the sole lifeline to finding the fleeing pair. Babar,
who was ultimately an innocent and innocuous adolescent only searching for camaraderie, faced
mounting harassment as the gang members became impatient in their search. As the film
concluded, Babar, unable to handle the gang’s torment, committed suicide, complicating the
young couple’s plans to escape and underscoring the gravity of the situation. Throughout the
film, the delinquent teens found themselves confined to their isolated quarter on the margins of
Paris, shown as a barren terrain devoid of landscaping. The composition of the gang was divided
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between teens with true criminal aspirations and otherwise harmless youths who joined the gang
in an effort to escape the monotony of their living situation. The social commentary was clear.
Carné suggested that the circumstances created by the grands ensembles, a central tenet of
France’s postwar modernization efforts, had a corrupting influence on French youth, inciting
symptoms of juvenile delinquency.26
The film underscored a popular perception about the links between juvenile delinquency
and the grands ensembles. Alongside the critique of the HLM resided another narrative woven
throughout Carné’s film. The petty thefts committed by the adolescent gang in Terrain Vague
often amounted to little more than shoplifting of cheap goods, as the teens began to accumulate a
collection of inexpensive consumer products. As Carné made clear, their thefts were not meant to
supplement basic needs, but were instead exchanged for cash in a scheme to obtain spending
money meant to abet their search for entertainment. The gang’s actions spoke to a more
widespread societal concern – the question of teenage consumption in a newfound mass society.
Mass Culture, Americanization, and the Question of Juvenile Delinquency
What especially troubled observers in the late 1950s was how some of the most apparent
symptoms of juvenile delinquency seemed to be borne out of the emergent age of affluence
reshaping France and other Western European countries. While the dilemma of juvenile
delinquency was certainly not new, conventional wisdom had always linked it to the most
marginalized segments of society. By contrast, in the early Fifth Republic instances of teenage
crime were credited to all social classes amid a rising tide of juvenile delinquency, despite that
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the standard of living and material prosperity were ostensibly higher than ever. This paradoxical
phenomenon raised questions about the side effects of an emergent mass culture on
impressionable youth precisely at a time when many debated the merits of France’s drift toward
an American-style society of consumption. Questions of juvenile delinquency thus became
deeply implicated in larger anxieties about a changing nation. For commentators, the blousons
noirs became a cautionary tale about the dangers of adopting a lifestyle built on mass
consumerism.
The rise of mass consumer society was a key feature of what economist Jean Fourastié
deemed the “Trente Glorieuses” (the “Thirty Glorious Years”), a period of unprecedented
economic growth.27 Underway by the early 1950s and in full force by 1954, mass consumerism
had a tremendous influence in shaping the composition of the everyday. It had ramifications
across all aspects of French life, from business models and advertising strategies to grocery
shopping and transportation. It altered perceptions of leisure and entertainment as well as work.28
Mass consumerism shaped patterns of social organization and generally raised living standards
across the French populace, while also serving to expose economic inequality and class-based
divisions.29
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Despite a broad base of support for consumerist aspirations, there remained a societal
ambivalence about the effect of American-style mass culture and mass consumption on
“traditional” French culture.30 “Americanization,” offered a fluid term that cut across the
political spectrum with which to lament the supposed impact of America, real or imagined, in all
domains of French society. Whether discussing the expanded economic and political role of the
United States in the postwar world order or simply making reference to “American” inventions
like supermarkets or blue jeans, commentators applied the term with equal gusto. The concept
galvanized many in France, from the left-leaning intellectual circles of Jean-Paul Sartre and
Simone de Beauvoir to the shopkeeper populism of Pierre Poujade, and found articulation across
a vast plane of cultural expression.31 Even as many embraced the promise and potential of
technocratic modernization and mass consumption, the changes they imposed on the
organization of everyday life appeared striking enough to prompt reflection, and occasionally
strong criticism.
Using youth as its point of entry, a 1959 article in the weekly news magazine L’Express
echoed larger social concerns about the coming of American-style mass consumer society in
France. Glancing across the Atlantic, the magazine inspected consumption trends among
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American teenagers. The United States, the article made clear, offered a glimpse into an
uncertain future: “Those Americans have already put into practice what the French are only just
beginning to have doubts about.”32 For L’Express, some of the habits proved dubious at best. It
found that American teens regularly spent hours per week watching television or talking on the
telephone, frequented cinemas, bought records and clothing, and worshipped rock and roll. This
world of consumption was a testament, the article noted, to the growing economic clout of
teenagers, an influence that spelled a slackening of parental authority. All of the developments
covered had a particular resonance because they appeared to be a sign of things to come. “The
readings of this survey are very instructive for us,” the article noted, because “what’s happening
in the United States, in economic and commercial matters, only precedes what is going to pop up
here soon.” Confirming the inevitability of these tendencies reaching France, in an unqualified
but nevertheless potent statement, the article asserted that “specialists” considered French
teenagers to be “the most Americanized in Europe.”33
But despite the concern revealed in L’Express, American mass culture and consumer
products had already begun to infiltrate France in the preceding years. While cultural exports
like Coca-Cola appeared intermittently in France as early as World War I, nothing in the postwar
period symbolized the intrusion of American popular culture more than Hollywood film.34 To
put the sheer magnitude in perspective, by the late 1950s there were roughly 500 American films
released in Europe per year, compared to only about 450 films created by all of Europe
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collectively. While the European masses generally appreciated American film, young people in
particular found the style and imagery particular alluring.35 The 1953 film The Wild One,
directed by László Benedek and starring Marlon Brando as the rebellious leader of an outlaw
motorcycle gang, offered French teenagers a glimpse of American popular culture when it was
released as L’Équipée sauvage in 1954. The 1955 film Rebel without a Cause swiftly followed
The Wild One. Directed by Nicholas Ray and starring the charismatic James Dean, the film,
released in France in 1956 as La Fureur de vivre, crafted a portrait of juvenile delinquency
couched within suburban America. Attracting teens and worrying adults in equal measure, both
films offered a romantic and stylish representation of youthful revolt draped in leather jackets,
slick hair, and blue jeans.36
Though seductive to French teenagers, these films proved easy targets for French social
commentators who viewed them as tasteless and subversive American cultural exports that
contributed to (or even caused) juvenile delinquency. In particular, Marlon Brando and James
Dean, both exuding a defiant cool eagerly emulated by teens in France and elsewhere,
personified the invasive and suspect influence of postwar America. In his 1960 work Jeunesse en
danger, Henri Joubrel, who was at the time a high-ranking figure in the French scouting
movement, noted regrettably that “violence seems to be becoming the trend” among French
teens.37 “These adolescents,” he found, “slumped against the walls like the cowboys in the

35

Judt, Postwar, 351-352.
Later American films, like the 1955 film Blackboard Jungle (released in France later that year as Graine
de violence) or the 1961 film adaptation of West Side Story (released in France in 1962), served a similar function,
whether intentionally or not. For an examination of the emergence of teen-oriented American film genres, see
Thomas Doherty, Teenagers and Teenpics: The Juvenilization of American Movies in the 1950s (Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 2002).
37
Henri Joubrel, Jeunesse en danger (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1960), 11.
36

33

westerns” were capable of abrupt ferocity. He found that “an irresistible urge” brought teenage
boys “to imitate Marlon Brando in The Wild One or James Dean from Rebel without a Cause.”38
Similarly, the educator and writer Antonin Bondat, in his 1962 work Jeunesse et famille à
l’heure de l’atome, feared that American idols, emblematic of mass culture, encouraged an
atmosphere of conformity. Just as a million young girls blindly copied the ever-changing
hairstyles of Brigitte Bardot, he wrote, “the jacket of James Dean” is passed onto future
generations in “the aisles of the cinema,” becoming “the harness of a disoriented youth.”39 Other
commentators, pointing to James Dean and others with regularity, drew equally hyperbolic
conclusions about the dangers of an emergent system built around consumerism and mass
culture.40
Even the expert class had reservations about the influence of what Bondat called the
“imbecilic cult of the idol.”41 In 1959, Philippe Parrot and Monique Gueneau, a pair of
collaborating social scientists working under the leadership of Georges Hahn, a respected and
well-published psychologist, assessed the influence of idols of teen cinema. In their work Les
Gangs d’adolescents, the duo declared:
We have signaled that the delinquents find the source for their criminal
techniques in comics and films. The press and the cinema supply nothing
except recipes: they act in a very psychological way in giving to the young
people the possibilities of identification that the young cannot find in the
family: their heroes are going to be Eddie Constantine, James Dean, Marlon
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Brando, and Brigitte Bardot. The manner of dressing and the haircuts copy
these stars.42
As these critiques attest, the influence of American popular culture, personified by Marlon
Brando and James Dean, was one debated by commentators of many stripes. All were convinced
that, on some level, American popular culture and the mass consumerism it celebrated had a
suspect influence on impressionable French youth.
What appeared especially startling was how instances of juvenile delinquency, instigated
by popular culture and crass habits of consumerism imported from the United States, readily
permeated class boundaries and social groups. This phenomenon, it seemed to many, was a new
and unprecedented facet, one that defied a conventional wisdom that linked juvenile delinquency
to “asocial” degenerates otherwise segregated from the larger social body. Parrot and Geuneau,
in their 1959 study of teenage gangs, pointed to the US, where “juvenile delinquency has taken
the most spectacular importance,” to demonstrate the new contours of the problem. Examples of
juvenile, inner-city crime in New York City and elsewhere offered vivid examples to underscore
their point. Anticipating the class and race-based assumptions of their audience, however, the
researchers insisted that readers should not assume that the criminal offenses emanated from
actors of “proletarian and sub-proletarian milieus,” adding that they found an ever-increasing
number of “bourgeois youth gangs.” “The gang phenomenon has thus become a general
phenomenon that affects all social strata,” they concluded.43 Emile Copfermann drew similar
conclusions in his 1962 reflection on the blousons noirs. He averred that if prior World War II,
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juvenile delinquency had primarily affected “working-class milieus,” it had “gravely extended”
in the postwar period to include “bourgeois families” as well.44 With delinquency and
hooliganism extending to middle-class teenagers, attention turned to the youth-oriented mass
culture, availed by rising prosperity, and its influence in shaping the blousons noirs.
French Rock and Roll and the Legacy of the Blousons Noirs
The rise of rock and roll reinforced the association between teenage consumption and
delinquency. It encouraged many of the same debates about the influence of mass culture that
films like Rebel without a Cause provoked several years prior. The images of teenage
consumption, crafted in the media, were inextricably linked to the supposed savagery of the
musical genre. It played into the same fears about Americanization, as well as a general anxiety
about the consequences of a culture built on mass consumerism, only here the danger spoke
French. The growth of indigenous rock and roll represented a new threat from within and served
as an apparent measure of France’s Americanization.
Rock and roll’s ascent was slower and later in France than in most other Western
European countries. There had been rumblings during the 1950s. In 1956, for instance, Bill
Haley and the Comets’ “Rock around the Clock” became a bestseller and the Frenchman Henri
Salvador, performing under the alias Henry Cording, released four satirical, but nevertheless
successful, rock and roll songs.45 Others, like Gilbert Bécaud, whose energetic live performances
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earned him the name “Monsieur 100,000 volts,” attained success in this early period of French
rock and roll.46 Building on this modest foundation, by the early 1960s France had produced a
steady ensemble of rock and roll stars. The first to achieve success was Richard Anthony, who
began releasing singles from late-1958 onward. The Egyptian-born singer who nevertheless
performed in French scored his biggest hits adapting popular American songs by artists like
Bobby Darin, the Everly Brothers, and the Coasters.47 Soon came musical acts with vaguely
ominous-sounding names like the Chaussettes Noires (the Black Socks) and the Chats Sauvages
(the Wild Cats). Undoubtedly, the most popular of all though was a young artist performing
under the stage name Johnny Hallyday. With boyish good looks, a distinct if unexceptional vocal
ability, and a physical presence derivative of Elvis Presley, the young performer quickly became
the face of French rock and roll. He released his first disc in March of 1960 with the record label
Vogue.48 Within a year he was performing to sellout crowds in some of France’s most
prestigious performing halls, including the Olympia in Paris.
The rise of rock and roll in France was inseparable from the simultaneous appearance of
a mass consumer society. The raucous sounds of electric guitars emanating from jukeboxes,
record players, and transistor radios became a potent symbol of an emergent mass culture in
France. It signaled the arrival of the teenage consumer, as adolescents readily forfeited their
newly acquired spending money in exchange for records, clothing, radios, and cinema tickets.49
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instance, there were only 260,000 transistor radios in the Hexagon. Within three short years, that
number had grown eight-fold to over 2.2 million.50 Studies from the period found that a growing
number of teenagers owned an assortment of consumer products, including record players and
musical instruments. A lucky few even owned their own automobiles. Meanwhile, some of the
leading teenage musical performers sold records by the millions. For those adolescents unable to
buy their own records, some 20,000 jukeboxes were scattered throughout France availing teens
of the latest hits songs.51 These symbols, and the ubiquitous sounds and sights they provided,
announced the flourishing of a society of consumption.
However, the arrival of a truly mass culture, built on consumer capitalism, was not
without its critics. Vocal commentators decried its banal nature, standardizing tendencies, and
propensity to fetishize particular idols and celebrities. The very same qualities that offered a
class-crossing democratization of culture also represented an attack on traditional notions of high
culture and taste. Rock and roll, with its supposedly unintelligent lyrics and simplistic musical
arrangements, became a soft target for commentators decrying the effects of the mass production
of culture.
The links between French rock and roll and the larger issue of Americanization were
accentuated by some of most visible rock stars from the era. It was customary, for instance, for
early performers to adopt American-sounding names. Claude Moine, the lead singer of the
Chaussettes Noires, performed under the name Eddy Mitchell. The Chats Sauvages front man,
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Hervé Forneri, operated as Dick Rivers. Most famously, the young Frenchman Jean-Philippe
Smet went on to become the famed Johnny Hallyday. In fact, Hallyday, perhaps more than any
other performer, cultivated ties to America; in the early period of his career, his record company
marketed him as being born in America and being bilingual in both English and French (neither
of which was true).52 The tactic may have helped authenticate Hallyday to a generation of French
teenagers infatuated with American popular culture. For older generations, however,
Americanized performers like Hallyday and his peers lent credence to the notion that France was
being recast as a modernized society of mass culture akin to the United States.
Commentators feared that mass culture, of which rock and roll was emblematic, created
an atmosphere of conformity, one that discouraged independent thinking and individuality. For
Roger Holeindre, a far-right political activist and Algerian War veteran, the coming of rock and
roll reflected a larger struggle whereby a weakened France, shorn of its empire, succumbed to
the temptations of American-style mass consumerism. Holeindre understood why rock and roll
and the Twist resonated with young people, but he feared that it was symptomatic of a generation
of youths rendered uninspired and unproductive by a vapid popular culture. While it is normal
for young people to sing and dance, he wrote, “it is nevertheless abnormal that their horizon
stops there” and while Johnny Hallyday might be the “idol” of French youth, “it is unthinkable
that beyond this young singer, there is nothing else.”53 He questioned the wild haircuts, the
hardened visages, and the shouting. Above all, he wondered, “why these American names?”
Emile Copfermann, meanwhile, pondered the multiple ways that the “amusement industry”
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shaped an image of youth and encouraged the masses to follow. He found that the tenets of mass
culture promoted instant gratification and a lack of intellectual engagement. Pointing to rock and
roll as an example, he believed that young people embraced it because it could be consumed and
enjoyed immediately and without thought.54 Similarly, Henri Joubrel observed a growing
tendency for young people, content to do nothing productive with their free time, to loiter in the
streets like “sheep huddled together before the storm” listening to their “narcotic,” rock and
roll.55 For these various critics, rock and roll embodied a mediocrity bestowed by American-style
mass culture that sapped the individualism of an entire generation.
Rock and roll also exacerbated existing fears about juvenile delinquency. The
controversy linked to the nascent musical genre quickly became woven into the existing
discourse on the blousons noirs. From its inception, rock and roll conjured images of teenage
hooliganism. Over a span of two years, observers had linked the musical style to teen-related
disturbances in over five hundred cities across three continents.56 In France, 1961 marked the
emergence of rock and roll festivals. The Palais des Sports in Paris provided the setting for these
spectacles. Like the festival held in February of 1961, the concerts often featured any
combination of scandals. Some teenage attendees brawled in the crowd. Others destroyed and
dismantled stadium seating. On occasion, police needed to intervene to bolster security. In some
instances, concertgoers even hurled objects at the musical performers.57 These antics, covered in
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the press, harkened the same type of delinquent acts ascribed earlier to the blousons noirs and
lent the impression that rock and roll attracted, even incited, violent behavior.
The image procured by early French rock and roll stars only enhanced this perception.
Some of the most recognizable figures of French rock donned the familiar leather, blue jeans,
and greased hairdos in an effort to seize some of the same cool defiance exuded by American
idols like James Dean and Elvis Presley. Vince Taylor, more than any other singer, typified this
trend. For many, Taylor embodied the most ominous aspects of rock and roll. He wore black
leather from head to toe, the solid dark mass interrupted only by an ostentatious chain draped
over his unbuttoned shirt; his hair, as dark as the leather he wore, greased into an elaborate
coiffeur. Taylor, a British-born rocker who sang in English, earned a reputation for his frenetic
live performances filled with provocative twists and gyrations.58 Outfitted in garb strikingly
similar to those of the blousons noirs while serving frenzied and riotous live performances, stars
like Taylor helped cement the links between rock and roll and teenage delinquency.
This conflation of rock and roll with the ominous imagery of the blousons noirs was
mocked in a 1960 song by Gilbert Bécaud, a performer who only several years prior had
captured the attention of French teenagers before being displaced by the meteoric rise of singers
like Hallyday. His song “Age Tendre et Tête de Bois” (“Tender-aged and Stubborn”) aimed to
mock the apparent changes to youth-oriented music in France.59 Sung in a sardonic tone, the
lyrics described a sordid relationship between two delinquent teens who spent their time together
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in the streets at night. Bécaud joked in the lyric that, with the girl wearing pants and a jacket,
onlookers would think they saw two males together. The second verse made clear that these
delinquents represented prime examples of Americanized French youth. The two characters
described in the song spent all of their days going to the cinema, drinking Coca-Cola, and lurking
around jukeboxes. In an effectively sarcastic way, Bécaud managed to craft the image of two
delinquent teens seduced by the allure of leisure and consumption.60 They were caricatures of
Americanized “others,” an image that, however exaggerated, reflected popular perceptions about
young rock and roll fans.
The half-joking barbs levied in song lyrics were hardly a stretch though. Serious studies
from the era corroborated what Bécaud and others only assumed. The Centre de Formation et de
Recherche de l’Education Surveillée observed that recreational sites, including cinemas, cafés,
and arcades, often served to foster and incubate the formation of juvenile gangs. One Paris police
captain found that the cafés and bars featuring jukeboxes attracted, above all else, adolescents
who enjoy the “thundering atmosphere of modern music,” a setting that facilitated the creation of
youth gangs and served to “foment asocial acts.”61 The concern over teenagers congregating in
cafés and elsewhere was part of a larger interest in understanding the growth of adolescent
leisure as an integral part of the emergent age of affluence and its accompanying society of
consumption. During the late 1950s, the economic affluence and prosperity trickled down to
many teenagers in the form of disposable income. The period also witnessed a sweeping
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expansion of secondary and university education. As a result, adolescents remained students
longer and, though they possessed some money of their own, were freed of much of the
responsibilities to work and contribute to the family income, resulting in a growth of leisure as a
significant part of teenage life. While the French state actively promoted sporting activities and
youth cultural centers to occupy and educate young people, the growth of idle leisure seemed a
likely cause for gang formation and delinquent behavior. Indeed, in direct contrast to youth
idealized by the French state, the imagery of delinquent teenagers loitering in cinemas and cafés
offered evidence to the supposed dangers of leisure time spent consuming mass culture.62
It was, to observers at least, a new and unprecedented trend spreading across France. Not
limited to the working-class quarters of large cities, the mass culture-fueled juvenile delinquency
threatened to reach even the quietest of villages. Jean Cau, an award-winning journalist for the
weekly news magazine L’Express wrote a 1961 article titled “Return to My Village.” In the
piece, the author recounted a recent return to his natal village, a sleepy commune situated to the
north of Paris, and his surprise upon witnessing a number of palpable changes. The village, he
wrote, was filled with ominous teens who lined the main thoroughfares in foreboding hordes.
Inquiring to his nephew about the recent phenomenon, the adolescent informed him that the
idyllic commune was now “full of blousons noirs.”63 Who were these young troublemakers?
When asking his nephew about the teenagers in question, Cau was shocked to learn their origins.
One was the son of a butcher, the others were the offspring of low-level bureaucrats. They were
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from respectable families, he discovered, remarking that there was “not a single assassin among
the fathers of these young terrors.”64
They defied the working-class, urban stereotype that had previously been affixed to the
image of juvenile delinquency. Yet there they stood, lined along the streets with dyed and slicked
hair, blue jeans, and opened shirts. Later in the article, Cau pointed to an upcoming Johnny
Hallyday concert, an obvious culprit for the manifestation of blousons noirs in his petite
childhood commune. “This national calamity named Johnny Hallyday,” the author wrote, had
disembarked in the village, Persan, as part of his 1961 tour. Cau recounted Hallyday’s search for
the director of the municipal theater. Hallyday, he wrote, asked how many police would be
available for the upcoming concert, warning that young people had destroyed venues on each
stop of his tour. According to Cau, the theater director replied, “Ho, ho! Here isn’t everywhere.
It’s calm here; the young people are calm; nothing happens here.” Sure enough, when Cau asked
about the concert, his nephew confirmed that, true to Hallyday’s warning, the young people had
proceeded to cause an uproarious commotion.65
The veracity of Cau’s account cannot be verified. Even if he took journalistic liberties,
though, the point remains the same. Cau spoke for many in his consternation towards the
youthful trends built on a foundation of mass culture and consumption. A thought near the end of
his piece was telling. “Today, young people neither whistle nor sing. They shout,” he wrote. “At
what? At the death of all the gods (father, France, family, church, etc.)” in front of the idols who
have captured France’s adolescence.66 For Cau, like many others, the blousons noirs represented
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an unseemly harbinger of a changing France. During the period, from roughly 1958 to 1962, the
image of teenage consumption and mass culture became synonymous with the blousons noirs, as
influential voices speculated about the role of film and music in instigating adolescent
hooliganism. Even as other aspects of mass consumer society had already woven their way into
the fabric of French society, the areas that related to teenagers, such as rock and roll, remained
objects of controversy. The blousons noirs, imagined as Americanized, working-class “others,”
became a not-so-subtle way to question tangible aspects of France’s modernizing process. The
blousons noirs became enmeshed in debates about everything from HLM apartment complexes
to American popular culture. It was not until 1962 that the image of teenage consumerism began
to be divorced from the blousons noirs and juvenile delinquency. Only once an assortment of
commercial forces built an image of youth in contrast to the blousons noirs did youth-oriented
mass culture gain widespread acceptance. It was through this process that youth consumerism
became a rationalized and sanitized part of modern France.
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CHAPTER 2: ENVISIONING MODERN FRANCE IN THE TEMPS DES
COPAINS, 1962-1966
In late 1962, a new song, titled “Le Temps de l’Amour” (“The Age of Love”) could be
heard emanating from transistor radios and jukeboxes all over France. As a reverb-laden guitar
echoed over a dancing bass line and a driving drum beat, breathy, atmospheric vocals launched
into the song’s first verse: “It’s the age of love, the age of copains and adventure.”1 The singer
was Françoise Hardy, a soft-spoken eighteen year old from Paris’ Ninth Arrondissement. The
song, which sang about the pleasures and pains of teenage romance, typified a new style of
popular music, one that bore a resemblance to rock and roll but which notably lacked the music’s
edge and controversy. Hardy likewise represented a stark departure from earlier rock and roll
performers. The genre of which Hardy was a part, eventually termed yé-yé, gained widespread
popularity, providing for a fleeting moment the vibrant sights and sounds of an era. It announced
the arrival of teenage consumption on a grand scale and projected the image of a confident and
forward-looking France buoyed by its youthful exuberance.
Coming immediately on the heels of France’s bloody flight from empire, the “time of
copains” signaled a reorientation of “modern” France. During its relatively short lifespan, yé-yé
offered the dominant discursive image of youth during the era, the copain. By virtue of its sheer
ubiquity, the copain helped shape normative values of the ideal French teenager and, by
extension, modern France. This idealized portrait of adolescence upheld the image of the white,
bourgeois student as the universal teen experience. At the same time, the mass media, which
ultimately constructed the idealized copains, demonstrated an embrace of France’s increasingly
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technocratic society of mass consumerism and technological progress, all while straddling an
apolitical stance well-suited to the social and political tone set by Charles de Gaulle and his
fellow Gaullists in the early Fifth Republic. Altogether, the discursive image of the copain, so
prominent in the popular culture of yé-yé, offered a vision for French youth that was forwardlooking and worry-free. This particular construct, as the chapter suggests, proved well-timed to
its unique historical context and ultimately helped articulate a vision of modern France removed
from its colonial past.
The Rise of Yé-Yé
Les années yé-yé lasted for the better part of the 1960s. The core elements were in place
by 1961, and the phenomenon’s height was in the years 1963-1964 before the arrival of
competing British music and other French genres diminished its popularity.2 The rise of yé-yé
was made possible by the expansion of the mass media in the period following the Second World
War, by the rise of a system of mass consumer capitalism, and the emergence of a vast market of
commodities created specifically for teenagers. The importance of this context cannot be
overstated. These components allowed for the carving out of a unique space for teenagers and,
with it, the construction of an identifiable image of yé-yé youth. Popular music formed the basis
for this expansion and provided the means to organize a sizeable portion France’s youth into a
distinct category. In particular, the personal transistor radio and, to a lesser extent, the record
player provided the requisite means to forge an outlet for teens based on popular music made
specifically for them. These two products symbolized the teenage consumer revolution. As
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Anne-Marie Sohn writes, the portable transistor radio became the signifier of youthful
independence. By the mid-1960s the price had lowered to the point that they were affordable
objects to all social classes. In 1961 some 40% of young people already owned one, a number
that rose to 46% by 1966. With similar popularity, 42% of adolescents between 15-20 years old
owned their own turntable by 1966.3
It is therefore unsurprising that the first signal of a vibrant, music-oriented popular
culture for teenagers came in the autumn of 1959 with the launch of the radio program Salut les
copains on the commercial station Europe 1.4 The idea for the program came from Daniel
Filipacchi and Frank Ténot, two radio hosts with backgrounds in jazz who recognized an
opportunity to create a product for the growing population of French teenagers.5 Their program
offered the latest in American and eventually British and French popular music. Initially
broadcast only once per week, the success of the program quickly made Salut les copains a daily
fixture, airing at five o’clock in the afternoon just in time to catch teenagers returning home from
school. This brainchild of Filipacchi and Ténot was responsible, perhaps more than any other
source, for creating the momentum for yé-yé by directing young people en masse toward the
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popular music genre. Its influence was immense, largely because of the central role of the radio
in the lives of teenagers. An Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP) study in 1966 found
that 62% of adolescents between 15 and 20 years old listened to the radio daily; 81% listened at
least several times per week. When asked about their favorite programs, of which many were
listed, one in three chose Salut les copains.6 Within a few short years, numerous emulators had
programs on competing stations.
The overwhelming success of the radio program Salut les copains prompted its creators
to venture into print media. The two had already tried their hand at a monthly jazz magazine and
recognized a similar opportunity to launch a publication for France’s growing youth. The
eponymously-titled magazine hit newsstands in July 1962, with an initial print run of 50,000
copies selling out almost immediately. By December of that year, the magazine was already
selling some 600,000 copies per month; at the one year mark the number had surpassed a
million.7 But the numbers alone do not adequately reflect the sheer magnitude of Salut les
copains. An IFOP poll from September 1963 found that one out of every two young people
between the ages of 15 and 20 read the magazine.8 “Who hasn’t seen school children, heading to
class, ostentatiously brandishing an issue of SLC,” remarked one observer in 1965. Confirming
its ubiquity, he affirmed that “no city … [or] social class has escaped it.”9
The popularity of Salut les copains opened the floodgates and set the standard formula
for the genre: a healthy mixture of editorials, breezy quizzes and advice columns, token
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reportage of new music, and tantalizing coverage of the celebrity teen idols. In its wake came
countless imitators: Bonjour les amis in late 1962, Age tendre et tête de bois in early 1963,
Twenty in spring 1964, and Formidable in spring 1965, to name a few.10 In late 1964, Filipacchi
and his media group bought the rival Age tendre et tête de bois, converting it into a magazine
meant for teenage girls. Titled Mademoiselle âge tendre, the publication expressed more interest
in the fashions, romances, and hairstyles of the teen idols than their music. The success of yé-yé
even prompted unlikely organizations like the French Communist Party to venture into popular
music-oriented magazines.11
The rise of yé-yé also announced a shift in popular music, one that consciously sought to
strip rock and roll of its controversy and instead replace it with a musical form that appeared safe
for youth consumption. Yé-yé aimed to retain the energy and youthful exuberance that made rock
and roll popular while providing a sanitized alternative. This transformation came in part from an
evolution in the music industry. Recognizing the potential for profit in the teenage market, from
1961 onward major record companies began to send out talent scouts in search of young
performers who could be transformed into the next chart-topper. These company talent agents,
wielding tremendous influence, often selected stage names, assembled groups, and managed the
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contracts of their young clients, all in the name of maximizing commercial profits.12 Alongside
the music industry, the youth-oriented mass media also played a central role in taming rock and
roll. With the radio program Salut les copains for instance, Michel Brillié, one of the program’s
on-air hosts during period, recollected that “there was nothing provocative” about the program,
adding that “parents liked it” because “it was not dangerous” for their children.13 This perception
was likewise confirmed at the time by Filipacchi who maintained that “the important thing
[about the radio program] has been to demonstrate, to those who seemed to ignore it, that youth
isn’t a weakness and that teenagers are not necessarily simpletons or hysterics.”14 These efforts
to tame rock and roll was accompanied by changing consumer tastes. By 1961 rock and roll had
been mostly eclipsed by the international dance craze the Twist followed by the rise of a more
generalized and commercially-based pop music featuring upbeat instrumentation coupled with
lyrics about teenage romances and other similarly banal topics.15
At the same time, the new pop stars that rose to stardom during yé-yé had a distinctly
tamer, more respectable appearance than their earlier rock and roll counterparts.16 The arrival of
female singers, something that was conspicuously absent in the early years of rock and roll,
signified this shift. The first was Sylvie Vartan, a coquettish blond whose career launched with a
1961 duet with the already-established Frankie Jordan. By 1962 she was a household name,
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setting trends in both clothing and hairstyle. Both Françoise Hardy and Sheila followed. Hardy,
who became a star following the success of her 1962 single “Tous Les Garçons Et Les Filles”
(“All the Boys and Girls”), cultivated a persona that was both cerebral and demure. Sheila, born
Anny Chancel, by contrast possessed a girl-next door wholesome appeal aided by songs like “La
Première Surprise Partie” (“The First Surprise Party”). Debuting in late 1962, she attained
stardom by the following year. A number of new male pop stars gained fame too. There was
Claude François, whose 1962 song “Belles! Belles! Belles!” made him an immediate star,
followed by other similarly innocuous acts like Frank Alamo.17 The more established stars like
Johnny Hallyday likewise altered their appearance to reflect a more suitable image.18
When yé-yé was at its peak, these young idols briefly displaced the more respected stars
of la chanson française like Georges Brassens and Jacques Brel as the most popular acts in
France.19 A poll from September 1963 listed Johnny Hallyday as France’s most popular male
singer, tied with the crooner Charles Aznavour and only slightly ahead of Claude François. With
regard to female singers, Sheila, Françoise Hardy, and Sylvie Vartan were named the top three
performers in France respectively, far surpassing older acts like Edith Piaf and Juliette Gréco.20
But these pop stars were not simply celebrities. Instead, they were teen “idols,” a category
wholly separate from the more traditional markers of stardom, one that suggested a level of
familiarity and intimacy normally absent from the celebrity-fan relationship. What the term
indicated was that the popular singers were generally not much older than their fans with whom
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they supposedly shared the same interests, tastes, and experiences. This was evidenced in the
way that fans and the mass media alike referred to these idols by their first name, creating the
appearance that yé-yé represented a genuine community. “The yé-yé idol is no longer some
faraway divinity,” wrote Jacques Marny in 1965, but rather “more like the big brother or big
sister who has succeeded.”21 The supposed intimacy between audiences and singers was
perpetuated in the mass media as magazines and television programs offered unceasing
snapshots into the personal lives of the idols. Though undoubtedly mediated to preserve the
sanitized image of the teen idols, the mass media provided detailed accounts of their vacations,
romantic relationships, consumer preferences, and interests.22 And though their every move was
intimately followed and dissected by the media, these idols never wore the celebrity label.
Instead, they were treated as typical teenagers with familiar, relatable backgrounds.
The rise of yé-yé as a popular culture brought with it the image of the copain. The term
“copain” is perhaps best translated in English as either “buddy” or “pal,” a decidedly less formal
counterpart to the word “ami,” or “friend.” It became an expression, used ad nauseam, to refer to
the participants of yé-yé, both the musical performers as well as their fans. Used casually
between teenagers, the word simultaneously found its way into a bevy of commercial products,
from song lyrics and album titles to magazines and advertisements.23 Marketers needed only to
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use the word “copain” to announce the youthful appeal of their product.24 Its usage became so
widespread that, as one commentator noted, a person could not listen to the radio or open a
newspaper without “hearing talk about ‘copains’ or ‘yé-yé.’” The word was thus “no longer a
term of camaraderie used between boys” but instead had “fully become a category of young
people.”25 At the same time, the discursive image of the copain became a paragon of adolescent
bourgeois normativity, providing the dominant media representation of French teenagers in the
early-to-mid 1960s. As portrayed, the copains were carefree teenagers who found pleasure
through innocuous leisure and consumption. They were also the model middle-class students
whose apolitical stance and forward-looking disposition made them well-suited to the national
imperatives of modernization.
The legitimization of the copain came in part from its clear contrast to the earlier
blousons noirs, as observers readily affirmed the wholesome characteristics of yé-yé youth. “The
first thing that astonishes, it is their politeness” wrote Michel Cournot for L’Express following an
April 1963 concert at the Olympia in Paris.26 Describing a crowded concert hall of some two
thousand teenagers waiting for the show to begin, he witnessed no unrest amongst the attendees,
only teens sitting patiently “speaking in hushed voices with their sister[s], their friend[s], their
classmates.”27 A January 1963 article in the weekly entertainment magazine Télé 7 jours
confirmed the same: “Except for the hairstyle … the teenagers have nothing in common with the
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blousons noirs.” Unlike the blousons noirs, “their worldview isn’t hopeless” and “their
appearance is well-groomed.” Additionally, the article noted, the copains were thoughtful
contributors to society. “The teenagers don’t drink alcohol. The majority work. Some of them
still go to school. Others already have a career.”28 The tone and perception of journalists had
changed markedly from only a few years prior.
In the pages of the presse des jeunes (youth press), commentators likewise came to the
defense of the copains, contrasting for their readership (who would have been almost exclusively
teenagers) the wholesome yé-yé with their earlier counterparts, the blousons noirs.29 In the first
issue of Age tendre et tête de bois, for instance, the editor Jean-Patrick Maury introduced his
magazine in an opening editorial that delineated a space for the new youth of yé-yé. Seeking to
adopt some of the edgy language of earlier rock and roll, he affirmed to his readership that “it is
our lust for life that protects us from being bourgeois.” “But,” he added, “our parents don’t
worry, [because] we hate the blousons noirs, the broken chairs, and the shouting.”30 Adding this
caveat, the editor was no doubt mindful of the need to assuage apprehensive parents while
reminding readers that yé-yé was not analogous with earlier rock and roll trends. Instead, as the
passage illustrates, it co-opted the notion of youthful exuberance while stripping it of all
potential controversy. By 1966, any lingering comparisons to the blousons noirs were simply
dismissed as inconsequential. André Arnaud, in his regular Salut les copains column “Copains
flashes,” acknowledged that if the blousons noirs had caused dread among sociologists and
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moralists in the previous decade, “today these famous blousons noirs are married, have children,
[and] earn a living.”31
Not only was yé-yé stripped of the suspect elements of the blousons noirs and rock and
roll, it also managed to shed the blatant accusations of Americanization that had plagued the
earlier instances of teenage popular culture in France. Despite the fact that the music of yé-yé
was still largely derivative of American musical genres (indeed, many of the best-selling hits
were adaptations of American songs), the phenomenon proved able to add enough Gallic flair to
make it seem appropriately “French.” This perception was evidenced in a publication from 1966:
The expression “yé-yé” cannot be applied to anybody except the “French
idols” and to the French “copains.” There is, in effect, no relationship
between the traits of a French “idol,” like Johnny Hallyday … and that of a
foreign “idol,” like John Lennon (the Beatle-writer) … There is no
relationship … between the petite-bourgeois spirit of Claude François’ songs
… and the slightly special spirit (long live drugs, long live sex) of the songs
of the Rolling Stones … The yé-yé are French and proud of being so.32
At the same time, whereas earlier stars, including Johnny Hallyday, Dick Rivers, and Eddy
Mitchell, adopted American sounding stage names – some even going so far as to invent
backstories linking them to America – by 1962 many of the new musicals acts affirmed their
French credentials. Suddenly, the likes of Françoise Hardy, Claude François, Michèle Torr, and
France Gall added an unmistakably French identity to the musical genre, even if some new stars,
like Sheila and Frank Alamo, continued to employ vaguely American sounding names. At least
one reader writing to Salut les copains was pleased about this development. Thinking of Claude
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François, Marie-Claire Monjeau wrote that “finally, a French singer … whose first move hasn’t
been to Americanize his name!”33
Inclusion and Exclusion in a Modernized France
The sheer popularity of yé-yé allowed the image of the copain to become a visible
signifier of French adolescence in the mid-1960s. Though there were teenagers who fit the
description, the copain (and copine) was primarily a discursive construct, willed into existence
through an unending assortment of carefully-crafted magazine articles, advertisements, television
programs, and other visual representations. It was an ideal, constantly being created and
recreated in media discourse. The copain was “universalist” in its conception and aspiration,
meaning that it aimed to represent and reflect the category of youth, not any one particular social
strata. Despite these ambitions, “youth,” as defined in the yé-yé media, became the privileged
position of France’s white, urban, and increasingly technocratic middle class. It described
adolescence in terms that bode well for the modernizing aspirations of the Gaullist state and for a
French nation in search of a new national identity. Its forward-looking optimism contributed to
and reflected the larger societal desire to forget France’s colonial past. In the process, it masked
ongoing social disparities and tensions that few were willing to address.
Since the end of World War II, the language of “modernization” had given many in
France – technocrats, politicians, businessmen, consumers, and artists – common purpose,
providing a means to articulate a desire for deliberate change, for newness. With fresh memories
of the defeat in 1940 and the subsequent occupation-collaboration, the institutions and policies of
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the interwar years irrevocably discredited, the concept appealed to a large portion of the
population who believed that France needed to be remade and transformed.34 With the advent of
the Fifth Republic in 1958, the goal of modernization took on new imperatives. For the new
president Charles de Gaulle, it became a means to restore French grandeur and to announce the
return of France’s international influence and prestige, particularly with the fate of empire
uncertain. De Gaulle’s preoccupation with France’s economic, industrial, and social
modernization was made clear in a speech given on June 14, 1960. Eloquent and impassioned,
the speech explained the need to “transform our old France into a new country” by making it
“marry its century” [épouser son temps]. With the rise of decolonization, change had become the
country’s “great national ambition.” The choice was clear: ascend to the “rank of a great
industrial state” or “resign ourselves to decline.”35
A cornerstone of France’s modernization efforts, and the one that most directly involved
teenagers, was the expansion and reconstitution of education. As a key to the country’s
transformation, de Gaulle cited the need to improve national education to a level that
“corresponds to modern times.”36 Education, and the creation of an educated workforce capable
of managing a modernized economy, therefore became a central focus of state efforts in the early
Fifth Republic. Education’s portion of the state budget doubled between 1956 and 1965.
Additionally, the government enacted a number of reforms. In 1959, the school-leaving age was
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raised from age 14 to 16.37 The following year, the Ministry of Education merged technical
training, previously its own segregated division, into the general framework of secondary and
higher education.38 At the same time, the student population ballooned. In a 1964 speech, de
Gaulle’s Prime Minister Georges Pompidou touted the growth of France’s student population:
from 5 million students in 1939 to almost 9 million in 1964, from 440,000 (1939) to 1.8 million
(1964) in secondary education, and from 70,000 students (1939) to 510,000 (1964) receiving
technical education.39
The expansion of education, and the corresponding prolonging of adolescence, had a
palpable effect on the perception of youth. As Jean-François Sirinelli argues, the education
system underwent more change over a ten year span between the 1950s and 1960s than it had in
the preceding half-century.40 As a result, school, not work, became the primary focal point of
modern adolescence. Yé-yé reflected this new student ideal. Claudine Coppin, for instance, found
fleeting success with a 1963 single called “Le Twist du Bac” (“The Baccalauréat Twist”).41
Sheila’s first single, titled “L’Ecole est Finie” (“School Has Finished”), recounted the
burgeoning love of two teenagers – one seventeen, the other eighteen – who had completed their
schooling.42 In interviews and in media representations, the teen idols of yé-yé frequently
referenced their school experiences. The most obvious was Sylvie Vartan who, early in her
career, became known as the “schoolgirl of rock” [the “collégienne du rock”]. In 1962, the
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television show L’Avenir est à vous, depicting the seventeen-year-old singer in a scholastic
setting, interviewed Vartan’s teachers and fellow students who deemed her at once both a
“studious student” and a “modern girl.”43
For all the optimism though, aspiration often outpaced results for much of the 1960s. The
existing education system, despite its egalitarian aims, had long served to harden class divisions
in French society. Starting with the creation of universal primary education following passage of
the Ferry Laws in 1881, public education aimed to democratize opportunity for all French youth
through a system of compulsory, secular schooling. In reality though, the education system often
served to perpetuate the existing class structure in French society. Since the nineteenth century,
secondary education (lycée) provided the demarcation line between the bourgeoisie and the
lower classes (the peasantry and the working class). Generally speaking, working-class youths,
needing to enter the workforce, tended to leave school at an earlier age, while their middle-class
peers, with an eye towards the prestigious baccalauréat and eventual university admission,
continued to pursue education.44 Studies from the early Fifth Republic continued to find a major
gulf between social classes within the higher rungs of education.45 The pursued reforms,
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designed to modernize the education system, nevertheless struggled to keep up with a growing
population and a growing societal appetite for education.
And, despite these shortcomings, the French populace had acquired an insatiable appetite
for education by the 1960s. A flurry of advertisements in the teen-oriented media, reflecting a
modernizing France, steered teenagers toward emergent technological industries. Numerous
schools and training institutes advertised correspondence courses for new career fields, from
management to technical specialization. “Assure your future,” encouraged one advertisement in
Salut les copains, inviting readers to familiarize themselves with the field of electronics – the
“key to the modern world” – through self-taught home courses in either radio or television. The
advertisement, by Eurélec (the European Institute of Electronics), promised that customers of
their mail-order courses would become “veritable specialist[s]” in advanced career fields wellsuited for “the year 2000.”46 A similar advertisement by the Centre International d’Etudes par
Correspondance invited teens to pursue a variety of their courses by mail, which included
electronics, aviation, industrial chemistry, and refrigeration, ensuring that they provided the tools
for prosperity and happiness.47 In one issue of Salut les copains from 1966 four different
companies pushed their own packaged correspondence courses. There was the Ecole Universelle
offering a “range of modern courses,” for instance, or the Ecole Technique Moyenne et
Supérieure, which promised that its students would become technicians in “fields of the future”
that were both “lucrative and without unemployment.”48
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Magazine editors, like advertisers, understood that their audience would be part of this
new generation of students looking to the future for careers afforded by France’s modernization
efforts. Salut les copains, for instance, ran a regular article titled “The Career that I’ve Chosen”
with the intent of providing its audience a snapshot of the (gendered) professional and technical
career fields awaiting them. In the articles, young people explained their professions. For males,
there was Jean-Yves, who detailed his career as a photographer for a monthly magazine;
Christian, who worked as a printer for Salut les copains; Claude, who worked as a studio
technician; and Jean-Marc who worked as a rocket technician in France’s inchoate space
program.49 When asked whether programs existed to learn such skills, Jean-Marc replied that he
had gone to a technical college “like everyone or almost everyone.”50 For females, careers in
hospitality, retail, and cosmetics beckoned, as did assistant-level jobs: there was Françoise who
shared her career as a beautician; Roberte the flight attendant; Marie-Paule, who was a window
dresser; and Marie-France the secretary, among others.51 Even as the series highlighted other
careers, mixing the exceptional (racecar driver, writer, ski instructor) with the unglamorous
(taxicab driver), most of the coverage catered to the fields that were shaping France’s
consumerist and modernized economy. Collectively, they reflected a France that was
increasingly corporate and could boast expanded outlets for media, technology, consumption,
and leisure.
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Technical and industrial modernization, buttressed by a growing population of educated
students, was deemed essential to France’s transformation. Also on the Gaullist agenda was the
fostering of an atmosphere of national unity through apolitical nationalism.52 Since the French
Revolution, France had been wracked by deep political, social, and ideological cleavages that
intermittently reared their heads, often with violent consequences. This divide was on full
display during the Revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848; the Paris Commune; the Dreyfus Affair;
the fratricide of the Second World War; and, most recently, during the height of the Algerian
War.53 De Gaulle, always sensitive to these divisions and their effect on French grandeur, hoped
to quell, or at least minimize, them. The emphasis on national unity was felt in everything from
the 1958 Fifth Republic constitution to de Gaulle’s grandiose speeches and even governmental
cultural policy.54 Couched within the language of national unity was also the promise of social
and political stability, something that had proven elusive during the preceding half century.
Taken together, a “modern” France in the Gaullist imagination entailed a technologically- and
economically-advanced nation propelled forward by a population united in a shared goal. With
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the end of the Algerian War in 1962, this vision took center stage and, given the Gaullists’ solid
governing majorities, dominated national discourse for a good portion of the decade.
In general, the stars of yé-yé showed deference to the dominant political order of the early
Fifth Republic. In a 1963 interview in Salut les copains, Claude François acknowledged that he
did not have political opinions but followed by saying “I believe I am a Gaullist, by
conformity.”55 Others embraced the status quo more tacitly. Dick Rivers, for instance, in a 1964
interview with Salut les copains confirmed that he had a dislike for socialism and believed he
would not enjoy living in a socialist country, a sentiment no doubt shared by de Gaulle and his
fellow conservatives.56 Additionally, the major focal points of de Gaulle’s nationalistic foreign
policy – an insistence on French independence coupled with antagonism towards the U.S.-led
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance – also found support in yé-yé.57 André Arnaud, for instance, in the
January 1965 print of his monthly column “Copains flashes,” offered a sympathetic and thorough
interpretation of de Gaulle’s foreign policy for his teenage readership.58 He explained France’s
desire for independence following the humiliations of World War II and the reconstruction
period. He also pointed to the arrogant attitude of the U.S. in pushing its dictates on postwar
Europe, adding that “the strongest want to become richer and richer, even to the detriment of its
friends.”59 In a less sophisticated analysis, Johnny Hallyday likewise denounced U.S. foreign
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policy in Vietnam, adding that he was “altogether in agreement” with the foreign policy of de
Gaulle’s government.60
Ultimately though, what made the copain well-suited to the era were not its affinities to
Gaullism but, to the contrary, its complete absence of political undertones. For social stability
meant not affiliation with the ruling party, but rather a general reorientation of civic engagement,
from vehement protest and striking to educational and cultural engagement coupled with passive
consumption. Unlike much of the popular music that would follow later in the decade, the music
and idols of yé-yé offered song lyrics and imagery that upheld an inoffensive, middle-class
ideal.61 In general, the journalists and popular music stars of yé-yé often avoided discussion of
politics. They were more likely to put forth a generic civic-minded ideal. In an early 1966 issue
of Formidable, for instance, a picture of Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan casting their ballots
was the centerpiece of a brief discussion of the 1965 presidential election.62 Elsewhere, teen idols
simply dismissed politics, noting their lack of interest.63 Even in their lack of interest, though, the
yé-yé stars showed deference to the existing political order. All told, from its inception to its
general decline, no major teen idols or mainstream magazines within yé-yé offered criticism of
de Gaulle and his influence on France.
However, the same qualities that allowed the copains to project a confident, forwardlooking nation also served to distance France from its recent colonial past. The end of the
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Algerian War in 1962 marked a conclusion to what was a reluctant and often bloody retreat from
empire. Rather than reflect on the recent past, French society seemed content to enjoy the fruits
of the present, material prosperity and sustained economic growth.64 According to Todd Shepard,
following the war many in France began to reinterpret decolonization not as a sign of France’s
inevitable decline but as a marker of progress in what was an unavoidable stage of history.65
Interpreting decolonization as unavoidable, even necessary, allowed the prevailing historical
narrative to define France’s former imperialism as little more than an “unfortunate colonial
detour,” thereby forgetting the central importance the empire in general and Algeria in particular
had had to France’s identity.66
Within this historical context the selective remembering found in the yé-yé mass media
unwittingly lent credence to the belief that France and its colonies had been two separate
histories all along and that the end of empire had little bearing on the French Republic. Daniel
Filipacchi, in the first issue of Salut les copains, reflected romantically on the date in 1959 when
his eponymously-named radio program launched and the young people “in all of France,
Belgium, and Switzerland” finally gained “their” own radio program.67 What he failed to
mention, was that the program was also tremendously important to young French soldiers
serving across the Mediterranean during the brutal Algerian War. During the 8-year conflict
(1954-1962) over two million draftees served 27-month periods fighting to quell the tide of
Algerian nationalism. Equipped with transistor radios – an object that proved an inexpensive and
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popular parting gift for parents to buy their drafted sons – many soldiers spent their idle time
listening to music transmitted from the metropole. The image of young people, each with their
own portable radio pressed to their ears and tuned to their favorite stations, was a common sight
in both metropolitan France and in the barracks across Algeria.68 In neglecting this aspect of
Salut les copains’ lineage, Filipacchi’s selective recollection, looking more to the future than to
the past, was emblematic of many in France who were keen to forget France’s colonial past in
favor of a promising future. To recall the prime importance his program carried, from 1959
onward, for the conscripts fighting to preserve French Algeria would complicate the narrative of
France’s blossoming consumer society and economic miracle within the context of European
economic integration.
Increased attention to French conscripts stationed in West Germany likewise served to
erase memories of the Algerian War and the French military’s dubious role in it. Over the course
of the 1960s, soldiers became recast as agents of peace, not war (or, more euphemistically, as
was described during the Algerian conflict, “pacification”). Articles written during the period,
like one in the July 1964 issue of Salut les copains, could boast that it was young French soldiers
spearheading the nation’s rapprochement with West Germany. André Arnaud, writing for the
magazine, found that French soldiers were “hosted more and more often” by German families.69
He immediately extolled all of the ways the young conscripts strengthened national ties: in
Berlin, some 350 young French soldiers regularly checked up on local German youngsters and
their parents; in Freiburg, sixty local families regularly welcomed into their homes those soldiers
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who could not return to France during holidays; in Neustadt, young French soldiers and their
German peers went out together on weekends; and in Kehl, a group of young artillerymen
availed themselves to the local hospital to provide much-needed blood transfusions.70 The
soldiers’ newfound role as rehabilitators of Franco-German relations within the context of
European integration and the Cold War provided a welcome distraction from their prior role as
defenders of the French Empire.
In the mid-1960s, at a time when Algerian War veterans could not receive formal
recognition for their wartime service, the male teen idols of yé-yé, almost uniformly serving in
West Germany, bolstered the new perception of the French army.71 Since the Revolution,
obligatory military service was understood as an integral part of republican citizenship. When
their terms arrived, teen idols like Eddy Mitchell and Danyel Gérard garnered media attention,
though none were covered so closely and with as much enthusiasm as Johnny Hallyday.
Stationed with the Forty-third Infantry Regiment in the small city of Offenburg some 160 miles
south of the West German capital Bonn, Hallyday began his service on May 8, 1964.72 The
media relished the opportunity to highlight the singer looking prim in his military fatigues and
serving the Republic honorably. The July 1964 issue of Salut les copains featured a lengthy
photo spread of Hallyday in uniform.73 Later in the year, the women’s magazine Marie-Claire
provided similar coverage. It featured a number of photos of Hallyday interacting, in uniform,
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with locals in recreational activities, from table tennis to bumper cars. “[F]or his comrades and
young Germans, he’s just a soldier like the others,” the magazine wrote, adding that the youngest
of Germans “find him admirable.”74 In his own semi-regular article featured in Salut les copains,
Hallyday boasted about his good behavior.75 Later in the year, the news program Sept jours du
monde offered for television viewers a lengthy segment on the young singer’s daily routine.76
During his service, he was not allowed to tour or perform live. He was permitted to record new
music, however, on the condition that any publicity, such as the album cover of his 1964 record
Le Pénitencier, feature him in his army uniform.77 Like other teen idols, Hallyday’s stint in
Offenburg was a boon for the French Army. He became an informal spokesman for the army,
actively demonstrating an apparent civic-mindedness and a selfless and patriotic duty to the
nation.
In metropolitan France, the yé-yé popular culture, by suggesting a tacit racial
homogeneity, also lent the impression of a France fully disentangled from its former empire and
its colonial subjects of color. The question of race in France had long been a complex issue.
Since the French Revolution, republican ideology upheld color-blindness as a crucial element of
national identity; that “Frenchness,” unlike the German volk, was determined through a shared
adherence to republican values, not race or ethnicity. However, France’s experience with
imperialism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries racialized the meaning of
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national identity. As Tyler Stovall argues, by consequence of its empire, “the fact that most of
the citizens were white and most of the subjects black and brown meant that the very nature of
Frenchness was conditioned by race,” thereby laying a foundation for “French identity as white
identity.”78
The yé-yé popular culture emphasized this implicit assumption at a time when other
important cultural signifiers, like the popular comic Astérix, unwittingly spoke to France’s
supposed racial homogeneity.79 The idealized copain – personified by teen idols and portrayed in
advertisements – was almost uniformly white. This lent subtle credence to the Gaullist notion of
a unified nation prosperous and newly decolonized. However, it served to mask France’s
increasingly diverse racial complexion and, in the process, marginalize a growing immigrant
population, many of whom hailed from France’s former colonies. As early as World War I,
immigrants, usually from within the French Empire, were actively courted to fulfill various labor
needs and to compensate for tepid population growth. Among subjects from the empire, Arab
Algerians in particular constituted a major portion of colonial migration. In the decades
surrounding the Algerian War, a large influx of Algerian immigrants entered into metropolitan
France. Though official estimates fluctuated greatly, there were around 300,000 Algerian
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immigrants living in France before the Algerian War, the vast majority of whom were working,
single males.80 For a number of reasons, they commonly settled in enclaves on the periphery of
French cities, often in shantytowns and other equally squalid conditions. As a result, they often
went unseen, rendered invisible by their geographic and social marginalization.81 The irony was
that it was the population of ethnic immigrants, mostly from former colonies, who occupied
many of the low-level and laborious industrial jobs that helped propel France’s economic
growth, despite the fact that they were often omitted from the national portrait of a prosperous,
decolonized France.82
Despite the diverse complexion of France’s population, particularly given the role of
immigration from former colonies, racial and ethnic minorities were seldom represented in the
yé-yé popular culture. Few performers of color achieved stardom in the world of yé-yé and those
that did found only fleeting success. The handful of performers all hailed from France’s former
colonies. There was Les Surfs, a six-person musical group comprised of a family of four brothers
and two sisters. Coming from Madagascar, they recorded French-language versions of American
hits in a style similar to girl-group pop in the United States.83 Another star who achieved shortlived commercial success was Tiny Yong, a Vietnamese-born singer whose only major hit was
the single “Tais-Toi, Petite Folle” (“Hush Yourself, Crazy Little Girl”).84 When she was
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portrayed in the media, articles commonly emphasized her “exotic” Asian qualities in a way that
purposefully differentiated her from the more familiar copains like Sheila or Claude François.
One article in Age tendre et tête de bois, suggestively titled “Yellow Peril,” introduced Yong
alongside another, ultimately less successful Vietnamese performer named Bach Yen. Calling
the girls “two kimonos in the country of blue jeans,” the accompanying photo spread showed the
stars in ostensibly authentic Asian clothing and posing nearby, among other things, a statue of
Buddha and a decorative vase depicting oriental imagery.85 These staged photos contrasted the
actual text of the article, which described Yong as “the more Western of the two” singers, a girl
who regularly frequented the Latin Quarter of Paris and “always dresses like a European.”86
Despite fitting the same criteria as contemporary, white pop stars (sharing the same interests,
musical tastes, and fashion sensibilities), the magazine nevertheless made a special point to
accentuate her “otherness.”
The governing assumption of racial difference that underlay the yé-yé mass media and its
representations of youth was part of a larger articulation of adolescence in the early Fifth
Republic. In general, the ideal copain was defined in the mass media as white, middle class, and
urban; a subscriber to France’s program of modernization in all its dimensions. For one, the
prototypical copain was a student. Education was a centerpiece of the modernization efforts
championed by France’s political and technocratic elite of the era. The yé-yé popular culture, in
assuming the student ideal, both reflected and rationalized France’s postwar project of
technological and industrial advancement. At the same time, the copain assumed an apolitical
and vaguely nationalistic stance, one that echoed, if faintly, the rhetoric of unity and inclusivity
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that dominated Gaullist political discourse of the period. Its “universal” definition of youth was
nevertheless highly selective. It served to render invisible groups that did not fit comfortably into
its vision of modern France. In asserting the primacy of the middle-class student ideal, yé-yé
masked the ongoing disparities of the French education system, particularly for teens of
agricultural or working class backgrounds. Additionally, the idealized copain, as represented in
the media, was almost uniformly white. In the immediate aftermath of France’s withdrawal from
empire, the copain lent the appearance of racial and ethnic homogeneity within the Hexagon at
the expense of the vast populations that until only recently made up the subjects of the French
Empire and that represented a large immigrant population in France. Altogether, the copain, in
its definition of youth, articulated an idealized vision of a modernized and unified France
detached from its colonial past, one that nevertheless downplayed ongoing social inequalities.
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CHAPTER 3: YOUTH AND CONSUMPTION DURING LES ANNÉES YÉYÉ, 1962-1966
In a May 1964 issue of Life, American readers were introduced to France’s three most
famous young female singers, Sylvie Vartan, Françoise Hardy, and Sheila. The magazine
described them in terms its audience could understand: “What the Beatles are to England, the
singing Yé-Yé girls are to France.”1 Like the Beatles, these young French singers were products
of America’s influence on European popular culture; their tastes, appearances, and the musical
style in which they performed were all indebted (either directly or indirectly) to American
precedents. By 1964, the cultural currents that had drifted across the Atlantic were projected
back on the United States. The context in which French singers like Vartan and Hardy were
understood by American audiences was not music, but fashion. The Life article suggested as
much, with its coverage focused on the three singers’ clothing choices, keeping information
about their musical careers to a minimum. The article eagerly mentioned that the three singers
are “so popular that Yé-Yé clothes and Yé-Yé hairdos are sprouting all over France,” assuring its
readers that “young Americans who want to look like them will find they already have, or can
soon buy, most of the ingredients.”2 Significantly, while these young singers became the latest
paragons of a long-vaunted Paris fashion, they did so through the wearing of relatively
inexpensive and mass-produced ready-to-wear clothing.
For readers across the Atlantic, these young singers were the embodiment of a remade
France, one fully transformed into a society of mass consumerism. Yé-yé, perhaps more than any
other force in the mid-1960s, defined what it meant to be young in France, and it did so in direct
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relation to the emergent system of mass consumption. The very idea of youth became interwoven
with an all-encompassing consumer culture. Certainly, a number of scholarly works have already
detailed the postwar “economic miracle” that gave rise to a particular type of advanced consumer
capitalism in France (and Western Europe as a whole). This chapter examines the way the
copains of yé-yé reflected that change, stripping the exceptional newness of many aspects of the
consumer society to instead present them as ordinary, fully-integrated, and expected parts of
everyday life. Rather than focus on consumer society in the abstract, this chapter examines the
copains’ relationship to two specific commodities: the personal vehicle (the automobile and the
motor scooter) and ready-to-wear clothing. Though many other consumer durables would have
sufficed, the car and ready-made clothing provide, each in their own way, practical examples of
how France navigated the coming of mass consumer society.
The rise of yé-yé coincided with a broad rationalization of mass consumerism in France.3
The 1960s marked the decade when the full implications of a society of “mass” (mass
consumerism, mass culture, mass media, etc.) entered into national consciousness, finding
expression in fiction, social scientific studies, and among the polemics of public intellectuals.4 At
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the state level, with the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and the return of Charles de Gaulle,
the efforts at economic modernization begun under the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) continued
with vigor and an increased political importance. The notion of economic and industrial
modernization fit squarely into the larger Gaullist quest to restore French grandeur.5 De Gaulle
envisioned, as part of his effort to restore French prestige and international influence, a strong
and modernized economy, particularly with the end of France’s empire looming. Alongside a
strong economy, the material well-being and standard of living of French citizens also became a
metric for French grandeur. Leading Gaullists like Michel Debré wrote about the role of material
comforts in the larger project of France’s renewal and de Gaulle himself liked to boast that
“never before has the average standard of living of the French people been so high.”6
The newfound significance of consumption trickled all the way down to French
adolescents. Nowhere was this more evident than in a 1965 government publication, the
optimistically-titled France and the Rising Generation. The document, published in English by
the French Embassy in New York, offered American audiences an idealized view of France’s
youth. Though its representation of French teenagers was highly selective, it was nevertheless
telling what criteria the government decided to tout. On the first pages, the reader was
bombarded by a flurry of figures venerating the population growth provided by France’s baby
boom generation and, with it, the young generation’s growing economic clout in a world of
consumption:
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Today France has a youth market with independent buying power. For
instance, the 15 to 20 age group accounts for four million consumers and
spends close to $1 billion each year: 58% of this group is already working
and is free to spend its extra money as it sees fit; 43% of France's students
supplement their allowances by working part-time. It is now quite common
to give children allowances, and they have more freedom to use them as they
please.
… They buy clothing, sporting goods, musical instruments, books and
newspapers, radios and records. Many want to own their own motorscooters
or cars, which they consider a sign of independence; about 8% of all young
men and 7% of all young women own cars by age 20.7
These consumer desires, the document insisted, helped ensure the continued success of France:
This postwar generation is already a factor in the transformation which will
give France a new face by 1985. Realistic, anxious to better its living
standards, interested in modern technology, concerned with personal, family,
and occupational success, today's French youth follows close behind a
generation of young adults who are already playing a greater part in the
country's economic and social life than their predecessors did at the same age.
These two generations - the one now entering the labor force and the other
already part of it - are those that will shape the France of 1985.8
What made these proclamations all the more significant was how starkly they contrasted a
similar publication produced six years earlier, a 1959 book called The Young Face of France.9
Like France and the Rising Generation, the governmentally-produced book immediately
extolled the country’s revitalized birthrate while enumerating a number of adolescent
accomplishments that would assuredly bring success to France. However, unlike its predecessor,
which made adolescent consumption its first point of emphasis, the document contained no
mention of consumerism or teenager’s economic contribution to the nation.
The changing perception between 1959 and 1965 of teenage consumption underscored
the rapidity with which mass consumerism and mass culture inserted themselves into the
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everyday lives of French people during the period. Within the context of state-led modernization
efforts following World War II, mass consumption occupied an increasingly important place as a
driver of the French economy. Consumption had long been a gendered endeavor.10 In the
postwar setting, women in particular found a new civic role as consumers for the good of both
their families and the nation.11 Though their roles were never nearly as well-defined, teenage
boys and girls too became vital pieces in France’s consumer economy. Due to its sheer
popularity, yé-yé was essential to this changing role of teenage consumption and it is perhaps not
coincidental that the French government began putting a positive spin on youth consumerism in
1965, right at a time when the phenomenon had reached its apogee.
The Automobile
In its representation of youth, the yé-yé popular culture reserved a special place for the
automobile (or, as was often the case, motor scooters). The car’s presence in advertisements,
magazine articles, and elsewhere presumed its importance to the modern adolescent experience
and, as such, reflected in vivid, symbolic terms the extent of France’s consumer revolution. It
was during the 1950s and 1960s that the automobile arguably served as the symbol of France’s
postwar modernization efforts: the automobile industry was instrumental in the reinvention of the
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French economy, the car itself became a major component in the reconfiguration of France’s
social and urban landscapes, and it became the ultimate prize in an ever-expanding consumer
society. Both physically and metaphorically, the car was a key driver in France’s postwar
transformation; its eventual omnipresence embodied the spirit of France’s transition from a rural,
largely agricultural, and empire-oriented nation to one that was urbanized, decolonized, and fully
shaped by the defining cues of late capitalism.12
With the spectacular growth of personal automobile ownership in the 1950s and 1960s, it
is easy to forget that France actually emerged as an early leader in the international automobile
industry thanks to the pioneering efforts of figures like Armand Peugeot, the Renault brothers,
and Edouard and André Michelin, among others. During the automobile’s infancy in the 1890s,
France was the foremost producer of automobiles; only in 1906 did the United States surpass it
in total quantity produced, and even then the country remained the largest exporter of vehicles in
the world until World War I and remained the largest producer of automobiles in Europe until
the 1930s.13 In the 1920s, French automakers began incorporating various Fordist strategies to
varying degrees of success in an effort to increase production. During the decade, the industry
became consolidated, with the “Big Three” – Peugeot, Renault, and Citroën – occupying 63% of
the domestic market share.14 The economic depression of the 1930s eroded France’s dominant
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position on the continent, as both British and German automotive output surpassed it along the
course of the decade.15
It was only in the postwar period that French automakers truly embraced practices of
mass production. In the process, they contributed to the revitalization of France’s economy.
Alongside other important industrial sectors, the auto industry offered persuasive evidence of the
“economic miracle” reshaping the Hexagon. It was a key sector in which the French government
intervened with state-led planning efforts in the immediate years following the liberation and the
subsequent end of World War II.16 In the Fifth Republic, the Gaullist state deemed it a priority to
prepare the French economy for heightened international competition and trade, particularly with
the process of European economic integration underway. The solution was the creation of large,
French-owned corporations capable of competing on an international level. The auto industry
was at the forefront of these governmentally-endorsed efforts to consolidate French enterprises
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through calculated corporate mergers meant to increase competitiveness. As a result, by the early
1970s only four companies – Renault, Citroën, Peugeot, and Simca – controlled France’s auto
production.17
More than an economic boon, the personal vehicle also carried symbolic importance,
particularly for France’s new technocratic, salaried middle class. It became, as Jean-Pierre Rioux
suggests, an “instantly recognizable symbol of material well-being, one whose appeal was
universal,” and which served to enhance both work and leisure.18 For a growing crop of middleclass cadres, the personal automobile, alongside suburbanized homes, household appliances, and
other consumer products, became a visible component of the new middle class identity.19
Advertisements in popular magazines like L’Express solidified the relationship between the car
and bourgeois consumption. Likewise, popular yé-yé magazines, whose readership encompassed
France’s urban middle-class youth, advertisements consciously linked the automobile to
bourgeois notions of individualism and success. Depictions of vehicles in motion became
metaphors for freedom, as advertisements suggested that automobile ownership and happiness
were inextricably linked. In a 1966 issue of Salut les copains, an advertisement by Honda
declared that its line of sporty mopeds were “for those who win.”20 The accompanying photo of a
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smartly dressed young man with a pretty girl riding on the back left no doubt about the criteria
for victory. Another in Salut les copains, this time for the Peugeot BB3 Sport moped, announced
simply “comme ça!” (“just like that!”), its illustration appropriately conveying the message of
success and happiness built around middle class consumption.21 The various advertisements
served to solidify the automobile’s link to the modern middle class identity.
Though actual ownership was limited among teenagers, the automobile’s frequent
coverage in yé-yé magazines made it clear that the copains were expected to think about
automobiles and the day when they would eventually acquire one. To point to one example, an
article in the May 1964 issue of Twenty offered readers a helpful guide to buying affordablypriced used cars.22 The magazine Formidable, meanwhile, reserved a prominent space for
automobiles in its “news” section; its inaugural issue in October 1965 spotlighted the new
Citroën DS 21.23 In ever-increasing frequency, advertisements similarly affirmed the importance
of the automobile to modern life.24 They consciously played upon the apparent youthfulness of
certain automobiles in an effort to appeal to their teenage readership. One promoted the new
Ford Cortina Lotus, a “speed demon,” and its budget-friendly counterpart, the Ford Anglia,
concluding that “finally, an automobile of youth, for young people.”25 A similar advertisement
for the Renault R4 featured the pop star Sheila standing joyously at the open door of the car,
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calling it “love at first sight between two copines.”26 “What I like in the R4,” Sheila confessed,
“is its youth.”27 The reality though, despite the appetite for automobiles among young people,
was that a car was out of reach for many teenagers, due to both the cost and the required age of
eighteen before being eligible to obtain a driver’s license. A more viable option was the moped
or motorized scooter, and advertisers used the same language of happiness to encourage their
integration into daily life. An advertisement by the moped producer Motobécane for instance
depicted a girl, hair in the wind and smile uncontained, alongside a promise that “she is happy,
her life is easier” with their product, the Mobylette.28 Even if advertisements, in their promise of
happiness and success at the wheel of a car, offered transparent marketing ploys, they
nevertheless insisted upon with stunning regularity the centrality of the automobile to the modern
adolescent experience. The automobile’s saturation of media had its desired effect: by 1966, as
one survey found, one out of every two French teens dreamed of owning their own car.29
The automobile’s presence went beyond advertisements though. Entering into cultural
expressions, it became mythologized by intellectuals and in literature and film. It was imagined
not simply as a means for transportation but as a venerable mobile extension of the domestic
sphere, its cabin enshrined with the same sense of intimacy and privacy as the home.30 This
mythology was extended to and reinforced by the teen idols of yé-yé. In the first issue of Age
tendre et tête de bois, an article highlighted how stardom had affected Johnny Hallyday, the
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preeminent star of the era.31 The performer was beset with sadness, the article noted, finding that
celebrity had deprived him of privacy, undermined his closest friendships, and imposed on him
unfair public expectations. Finding that he could not even walk outside alone in privacy
anymore, the singer turned to his automobile, a sleek Jaguar. “He enters into his car, his unique
kingdom where others can’t enter” the article read, “and in this steel cage, where he
paradoxically rediscovers his liberty, he forgets [his problems] at 190 [kilometers] per hour.”32
The car likewise came to signify a vital means for relaxation in a society of growing
leisure. The combination of rising affluence and generous state-secured paid vacations led to an
increased appetite for mass vacationing and mass tourism in the 1960s. Rising automobile
ownership, supplemented by the vast improvement of France’s highway network, meant that
French families took to the road with increased regularity to satisfy their vacationing needs. 33 In
the process, the car acquired a certain romantic quality. As Ellen Furlough writes, “both
vacations and cars could signify mythic escape, personal autonomy, and displacement in time
and space.”34 It made sense, then, that when in mid-1965 the entertainment magazine Paris
Match caught up with the newlywed celebrity couple of Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan
amid their honeymoon, the car factored prominently into the image of tranquil escapism crafted
by the magazine. The article opened with a large, colorful photo of the couple seated
comfortably in an open-top convertible. Hallyday, sitting behind the wheel, looked on casually,
his arm perched on the driver’s side door. His wife, Vartan, gazed off into the sky, as the scene’s

“Johnny est malheureux,” Age tendre et tête de bois, January 1963, 13.
Ibid., 13.
33
A 1963 poll for instance found that, of those who had traveled in the last year, 60% of them traveled by
automobile. George H. Gallup, ed., The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France, 1939, 1944-1975, vol. 1
(New York: Random House, 1976), 365.
34
Ellen Furlough, “Making Mass Vacations: Tourism and Consumer Culture in France, 1930s to 1970s,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, no. 2 (April, 1998): 263.
31
32

84

backdrop trailed off onto the image of a sunbaked city ensconced in palm trees and vineyards.
The bucolic setting represented a symbolic reprieve from the rigors of modern life. The irony, of
course, was that it was the car, the ultimate symbol of modernity, which made this retreat
possible. The journalists noted that, despite the couple’s efforts to find solitude, “a reporter is
always there to photograph the petite MG that they had rented.” “Often” the article continued,
the couple “roams the roads in search of isolated beaches.”35 The discussion of their travels and
their search for solitude invariably revolved around the automobile and the open road, two
touchstones of the modern consumer tourist fantasy.
For all its popularity though, the automobile also served as a stark reminder of France’s
uneasy search for an acceptable mass consumerist identity distinct from but nevertheless in the
shadow of the postwar American hegemon. In popular culture from the era, the conspicuouslyplaced American-made automobile served as a symbol, a subtle reminder of the near-hegemonic
role of the United States in spreading cultural products and business practices in the postwar
period.36 The car signified, for good or for bad, a vision of American consumer modernity; a
product that represented the fast-paced, materialistic society that, in the French imagination,
defined America. Cultural references during the period retained a marked ambivalence about
US’s apparent influence on postwar France. From Françoise Sagan’s 1954 bestselling novel
Bonjour tristesse to Jean-Luc Godard’s 1960 New Wave masterpiece A bout de souffle
(Breathless), American-made automobiles provided convenient plot devices, alternating between
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objects of desire and tragedy.37 In popular music, the lyrics of provocative singer Serge
Gainsbourg’s 1968 song “Ford Mustang” featured a litany of references to pop culture and
consumer products (Coca Cola, Kool cigarettes, and Zippo lighters) as well as a sprinkling of
spoken English words, an apparent recognition America’s cultural omnipresence in postwar
France.38
Within the context of the yé-yé popular culture, America likewise provided a familiar
point of reference. The young pop stars of yé-yé often brandished their large American-made
cars as a symbol of their success. Unlike other voices in French society, however, these yé-yé
singers made no effort to provide social commentary on the apparent “Americanization” of
France. Instead, as representatives of a postwar baby-boom generation coming of age in an
affluent society of consumption, yé-yé pop stars appropriated the connotations of the American
auto, themselves becoming symbols of France’s mass consumer transformation. For the teenage
pop stars, harbingers of a buoyant consumer modernity, the car served as a venerable extension
of their public identity. Richard Anthony, the singer of “J’entends Siffler le Train” (“I Hear the
Train Whistling”), for instance, was regularly pictured with his “enormous American car,” as he
was in a 1962 special issue of Disco revue international.39 An article in the May 1963 issue of
Age tendre et tête de bois, finding that “all the boys already have their car,” offered a colorful
spread of famous teen idols like Danny Boy and Vince Taylor flaunting their vehicles.40 One star
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was shown leaping jubilantly from his Ford Thunderbird convertible, another sitting comfortably
in his large Buick. Not to be outdone, Claude François was captured bounding above his open
top Thunderbird convertible, the caption below reading “la belle Américaine.” The montage of
car photos echoed similar articles in other magazines from the era,41 underscoring the significant
role of the automobile, in this case American, as both a desired commodity and an extension of
the teen idol’s identity.42
Ready-to-Wear Fashion
Just as the transformation in automobility announced the arrival of a mass consumer
modernity in France, so too did changing fashion sensibilities. Over the course of a decade, from
the 1950s to the 1960s, a major shift occurred in French fashion. Though Paris emerged from
war battered, the likes of Christian Dior and his “New Look,” introduced in 1947, firmly
reestablished France’s credentials as the world leader of elite fashion. By the late 1950s, though,
tastes began to shift from the haute couture of old to new lines of ready-made, mass-produced
clothing. Rising consumer demand led to an increased appetite for clothing that was both
affordable and fashionable. By the 1960s, prêt-à-porter (ready-to-wear) became a significant
force in dictating fashion sensibilities. Young people had a vital role to play in this shift: as they
gained an increasingly prominent role as consumers in the French economy, they began exerting
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pressure on designers and retailers to produce fashions that were new, fresh, and modern.
Designers and department stores alike proved quick to appease them, introducing chic ready-towear clothing lines that captured the youthful spirit of an emergent baby-boom generation. The
leading stars of yé-yé served as beacons of the shift from the ritzy attire of haute couture to
trendy ready-made clothing ensembles. Through it all, the Parisian fashion industry had to
readjust to changing tastes and the democratization of fashion, all while attempting to preserve
its illustrious status as the world’s leader of fashion.
Paris had long fancied itself as the global center of fashion, particularly women’s fashion.
The city became renowned for its haute couture, an industry of high fashion that produced
custom-fitted, luxurious clothing for the wealthy elite. Haute couture, broadly speaking, referred
to the highly recognizable fashion houses that garnered not only national attention, but
international attention too. In the twentieth century, for instance, Coco Chanel dominated fashion
during the interwar years while the likes of Christian Dior and Pierre Cardin shaped tastes and
sensibilities after World War II.43 Although the industry often served as a symbol of French
national identity, it took on special resonance in the immediate decades following the Second
World War. The fashion houses conjured notions of quality, sophistication, tradition, and taste
while simultaneously acting as emblems of France. For a French nation in search of reinvention
in the wake of war, high fashion provided a way to assert identity on the international stage. In
other words, as some have argued, if France proved unable to exercise military or diplomatic
influence in the bipolar, rigid Cold War paradigm, it could at least be a leading cultural influence
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in the world.44 This partly explains the government’s bolstering of the Haute Couture industry in
the postwar period – particularly the largest fashion houses – which included not only financial
support but also sponsorship of major fashion events as well as the procurement of essential raw
materials that were otherwise in short supply.45
At the other end of the spectrum rested confection, an industry that created massproduced, inexpensive clothing that did not require personalized measurements. Made possible
by the industrial revolution, confection, or ready-made clothing, became increasingly prevalent
during the nineteenth century. While it conquered the market for men’s clothing by the turn of
the twentieth century, its incursion into women’s clothing proved slower by comparison.46 Part
of the industry’s problem was perceptional in that it was associated with poor quality and equally
poor taste. If haute couture represented the sophistication of artisanal quality, confection
embodied the apparent shortcomings of a society of mass production and consumption. The
reputation of women’s ready-to-wear clothing began improving in the interwar years, thanks to a
gradual improvement of prefabricated goods, though it still lagged far behind couture. In this
way, the assumptions about confection – that genuine artistic quality was incompatible with
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modes of mass production and consumption – were indicative of France’s larger ambivalence
about the gradual rise of mass consumer society.
The 1950s was a pivotal moment in the French fashion industry. It was during this decade
that ready-to-wear fashion made significant gains at the expense of haute couture. On some
level, the fashion houses of haute couture faced something of an identity crisis as they tried to
keep pace with not only the high production of ready-to-wear, but also changing consumer tastes.
To be sure, in the world of fashion haute couture reigned supreme for a good part of the decade;
the introduction of Christian Dior’s “New Look” in 1947 – slim cinched waistlines, longer skirt
lengths, softened shoulders, and with it the accentuation of the female silhouette, a look that was
simultaneously refreshing and nostalgic – set the new trend for women’s fashion and
reestablished Paris’ reputation as the center of global fashion.47 However, rising purchasing
power among a growing and insatiable demographic of middle-class consumers brought with it a
greater demand for accessible fashion. Their desire for stylish yet affordable clothing led to a
democratization of fashion; no longer was fashion the preserve of the wealthy few, a marker of
distinction, but instead an object of mass consumption, a commodity supposedly available to all.
What role did young people play in this transition? As teenagers acquired disposable
income, they began to exert pressure on the consumer market, shaping tastes in the process. Over
the course of ten years, between 1953 and 1963-1964, teenagers’ expenditures on clothing grew
at a phenomenal rate (131% for girls, 103% for boys).48 A 1963 survey by the Institut national de
la statistique et des études économiques found that, for the first time in history, the 15-20 year
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old age group spent far more on clothing than any other age category. Importantly, young people
had little appetite for the haute couture of days past. What at one time seemed refined and
sophisticated had become elitist and ill-suited for the demands of the modern life.49 Their taste in
fashion was not only built in opposition to older generations, but was cosmopolitan in its nature.
The mini-skirt, after all, probably the single most iconic fashion symbol of the 1960s babyboomer generation, had its origins in London, not Paris.50
Both fashion retailers and designers recognized the changing tide of fashion and quickly
sought to accommodate the tastes of young people. The line between haute couture and readymade clothing began to blur, as a new type of ready-made fashion, prêt-à-porter, began adopting
the same ethos of quality long linked to high fashion. During the 1950s, the major Paris
department stores began an aggressive push to rebrand themselves. The Galeries Lafayette, for
instance, teamed with esteemed ready-to-wear designers like Michèle Rosier and Emmanuelle
Khanh to produce its own unique fashion lines independent of the couture houses. Both Galeries
Lafayette and Printemps, vying for young consumers, introduced departments devoted
exclusively to teenage girls, eagerly advertising these new additions to their respective stores.51
At the same time, some of the major fashion designers of the 1960s, including Yves Saint
Laurent and André Courrèges introduced relatively affordable, ready-made clothing lines meant
to capture the youthful spirit of the times. Saint Laurent himself acknowledged that “the young
lead very different lives from the lives of women who wear couture fashion. Not all of the young
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would want couture even if they could afford the price.” He concluded that "Couturiers, haute
couture, la mode – they’re all terms that are out-dated."52
The popular stars of yé-yé helped drive the shift toward ready-to-wear, as the
phenomenon’s leading female singers proved capable fashion tastemakers. In setting trends for
adolescent style, they pushed ready-to-wear fashion to the forefront while providing a vibrant
image of a consumerist France. Brigitte Bardot, who had famously remarked that couture was for
grandmothers, had already made ready-made clothing a key component to her look.53 Building
on Bardot’s precedent, the various yé-yé girls brought the connection between youth and readyto-wear to new heights. Each star – Sylvie Vartan, Françoise Hardy, Sheila, Gillian Hills,
Michèle Torr, and others – had their own distinct though readily-copied look, which allowed
teenage girls to imitate the idol of their choosing. Their fashion tastes were on full display on
record sleeves and in photos and magazines.54 Yé-yé magazines popular among teenage girls
helped stoke the desire for clothing through unceasing coverage and analysis of the latest tastes
and trends. For instance, the magazine Mademoiselle âge tendre routinely featured prominent
sections on fashion, all of the ready-to-wear variety, encouraging teenage consumers to adopt the
latest styles.
The April 1965 issue was a prime example. In one article the magazine spotlighted
Françoise Hardy, sharing “the six outfits from her wardrobe that she likes to wear the most.”55
Over the next several pages, a series of photos showed the young singer posed in a number of
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affected positions. The outfits on display encompassed everything from airy springtime wears
and stylish sleeping gowns to a space-age plastic dress. Her wardrobe apparently even contained
a full “Beatles ensemble,” from the iconic collarless grey suit to the Italian boots.56 In the same
issue, Michèle Torr served as the model for a spread of attires deemed “le style garcon,” which
included stylish pairings of jeans and pants alongside casual pullovers, button-up shirts, and
tank-tops. Alongside the clothing, readers were encouraged to visit major Parisian department
stores like Printemps and the Galeries Lafayette to purchase affordable copies of their own.57 In
the following month’s issue, Mademoiselle âge tendre introduced an article that offered a full
outfit, modeled by one of the popular singers, which girls could procure themselves. The
inaugural article introduced a casual-looking Gillian Hills in a skirt and flowery blouse.
Conscious of their aim to encourage the purchase of clothing, the editors indicated that the
carefully-chosen outfit was “at a price specially studied to agree with the greatest number of
girls.”58
The significance of prêt-à-porter came from the fact that it made ready-made clothing a
legitimate fashion alternative that, if not gaining parity, at least rivaled the products of the haute
couture industry. A couple of key factors helped elevate ready-to-wear. For one, women’s
magazines played a vital role. Starting in the 1950s, they recast the image of ready-made
clothing in an effort to shake the reputation of poor quality that had plagued confection.
Magazines like Elle coupled the language of sophistication previously linked to haute couture
with an emphasis on ready-made’s practical qualities that were well-attuned to the demands of
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modern life. Even the invented term prêt-à-porter – a literal translation of “ready-to-wear” – was
deployed by marketers and periodicals with the intent of differentiating newer ready-made
clothing products from their poorly-received predecessors.59 Teen idols like Françoise Hardy and
Sylvie Vartan regularly found themselves on the cover and in featured articles. Vartan for
instance, in a February 1964 issue of Elle, embodied the modern girl in need of modern clothing.
She modeled three sleek raincoats. “Leading a very active life, Sylvie searches for chic things,
[which are] easy to put on and that ‘hold up’ [tiennent le coup],” the magazine wrote.60 Hardy,
meanwhile, made the cover of a December 1963 issue of Elle. In the issue, she modeled three
stylish ready-to-wear outfits. Her influence was clear: "thanks to Françoise," the article read,
"beauty is possibly going to have new dimensions."61 As designer ready-made clothes, the attire
worn by the pop stars was often no doubt more expensive than something off the rack of a
department store, but they were still far cheaper than their custom-measured predecessors and
nevertheless represented a sharp departure from earlier fashion sensibilities.
Secondly, the improved image of ready-to-wear clothing came through the rise of
boutiques. Boutiques, different than both large department stores and exclusive fashion houses,
offered a new way to distribute ready-made clothing. As an outgrowth of a society increasingly
based around consumption and leisure, they went hand-in-hand with the rise of youth-oriented,
mass-produced clothing. Three boutiques opened in 1954 along the Left Bank of Paris, each
launching their own prêt-à-porter lines. By the 1960s boutiques were a full-fledged
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phenomenon, with some of the most renowned outlets of the decade including Hit Parade, JNS3,
Knap, Penthouse, La Machinerie, and Dorothée Bis.62 Even the leading teen idols of yé-yé
partook. The young singer Sheila, whose giddy persona belied her keen business acumen, cashed
in on the craze, opening the “Boutique Sheila” along the Rue des Jeûneurs in Paris’ Second
Arrondissement.63 The boutiques employed a number of novel strategies to create the optimal
atmosphere for the sale of clothing. Their in-store decorations, carefully-selected background
music, window displays, and floorplans were all devised to pique consumer interest, lure in
passersby shoppers, and encourage spending. They conscientiously hired teenage girls, who
could speak the requisite parlance, in an effort to attract a similar, like-minded clientele. They
also swapped out their products on a seasonal basis to encourage immediate spending and
repeated visits. Importantly, though, the boutiques typically maintained small commercial spaces
that differentiated them from vast supermarkets and department stores while giving their clothing
an air of exclusivity and sophistication.64
While the yé-yé girls helped legitimize ready-to-wear in France, the way they were
perceived abroad, particularly in the United States, offered further evidence about how the nature
of French fashion had changed. The U.S. and Parisian fashion had a long and checkered history.
Wealthy Americans were among the foreign elite who routinely bought the latest from Paris’
fashion houses, and they played a particularly important role in reviving the industry after World
War II when demand for luxury clothing was dampened elsewhere. At the same time, though,
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New York had begun to rival Paris as a leader in fashion design, particularly in the domain of
mass-produced ready-to-wear clothing. The postwar shift toward ready-to-wear in France, it
could be argued, was partly a response to mounting pressure exerted from across the Atlantic.65
Despite America’s influence on postwar fashion, though, France still retained a privileged
position in the American imagination, even in spite of the general shift away from traditional
haute couture.
This was evident in coverage from the period where, for American observers, the yé-yé
girls, outfitted in the latest prêt-à-porter, remained the personification of chic Paris fashion. As
the Life article introduced earlier in the chapter made clear, American audiences understood the
copines of yé-yé not for their music but for their embodiment of trendy French fashion. The New
York Times, for instance, examined Sylvie Vartan and her rising fashion influence. “In Paris,
what Sylvie wears the young crowd gets,” the article wrote, indicating that her clothing
ensembles had “been seen in Rome, Zurich and Athens – and not always on teenagers.”66 The
American fashion magazine Vogue, meanwhile, had a particular affinity for Vartan’s counterpart,
Françoise Hardy. She was, as the magazine declared in an August 1963 issue, the “New girl in
fashion.”67 Her soft good looks and mysterious charm, to say nothing of her burgeoning fame,
made her an ideal model for the latest and greatest fashions. The following year, in another issue
of Vogue, she modeled the latest inventions of one of France’s prêt-à-porter luminaries,
Emmanuelle Khanh,68
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The yé-yé girls helped ensure the heightened popularity of ready-made fashion in France.
Represented abroad, the singers proved able to preserve the fabled allure of Parisian fashion, but
they did so in a way compatible with the new realities of France's mass consumer society. In this
way, the yé-yé phenomenon served to highlight and celebrate the transformation of everyday life
caused by the arrival of an advanced system of consumer capitalism. Just as the meaning of
fashion changed during this crucial period in the 1960s, the car too took on heightened
importance to the workings and rhythms of daily life, a fact made clear in the discourses
perpetuated by the yé-yé media. As Kristin Ross argues, "France's cultural and physic
assimilation of the car and the new geography it had created" was, on some level, an indicator
that French society had accepted the "state-sponsored march into modernization" and all its
implications.69 On another level, the popularity of yé-yé reflected a similar societal coming-toterms with a France transformed by a culture of consumption and its constituent elements.
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CHAPTER 4: MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE YÉ-YÉ PHENOMENON,
1962-1966
On any other day, the sleepy commune of Loconville would have gone on unnoticed and
undisturbed by the rest of France. Numbering fewer than two hundred people, the small village
nestled in the Picardy region north of Paris was unaccustomed to fanfare.1 But on April 12, 1965
all eyes were on it. On that day, Johnny Hallyday, France’s resident king of rock and roll, and his
fiancée Sylvie Vartan, the darling of yé-yé, wed in the commune’s quaint medieval church. The
wedding brought a fairy-tale like ending to a courtship that had started several years prior. Their
mutual expressions of fidelity and love, affirmed by their insistence on marital union, provided a
model for budding teenage relationships everywhere. The day marked the culmination of a
relationship that had been followed closely by the media from the start. Les Actualités françaises
deemed it the “event of the week.”2 Paris Match, an entertainment and news magazine, featured
an angelic-looking Vartan on the cover cloaked in a pristine white veil.3 Various youth
magazines promised their readers a bevy of exclusive photos and insider accounts of the big
day.4 The event even garnered mention in international newspapers like the New York Times.5
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As the above episode recounts, between roughly 1962 and 1966, the leading symbols of
yé-yé readily affirmed a commitment to the gendered, heteronormative vision of sexual
relationships borne out of the legacy of World War II and the emergent Cold War culture of
conformity, conservatism, and containment. In spite of an emergent sexual revolution underway
at the time, the yé-yé popular culture, with regards to questions of sexuality at least, represented a
last gasp of a dominant postwar worldview that had already begun to erode by the mid-1960s.
This affirmation of the prevailing social and sexual order would appear at odds with the sexual
revolution underway at the time and of which youth and young people played so vital a part. As
earlier chapters attested, yé-yé served as an agent of change, offering a rational vision of youth in
a rapidly changing French Republic. At the same time, while providing a forward-looking vision
of a decolonized and consumerist France, the yé-yé popular culture also served as a point of
continuity and stability through its expression of dominant social and gender norms that had
reigned supreme since the end of Second World War.
To speak of the postwar sexual revolution is to speak of the liberalization of both state
policies and social attitudes concerning matters ranging from reproductive rights, homosexuality,
and sexuality outside the context of marriage. It was a phenomenon that appeared across various
Western nations (though at different paces and degrees of success) and had real implications,
affecting political and social rights as well as informing notions of gender and identity. In recent
years, historians have begun to emphasize the gradual nature of the sexual revolution that took
place in the West from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Deeming it the “long sexual
revolution,” they deemphasize the significance of any single event or moment in favor of a
longer view that recognizes a slow and steady process of change. Within this context, the
attitudes and actions of young people, buttressed by their heightened access to consumer
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products, leisure, and education, are seen as key drivers of this “revolution.” Arthur Marwick, for
instance, identifies the beginnings of a “long sexual revolution” already evident, if subtly, in the
late 1950s, writing that “the new assertiveness and innovativeness of youth” towards the end of
the decade was an integral part of a complex system of changing social and sexual values.6 The
editors of the work Between Marx and Coca-Cola likewise see sexual liberation as a key
component in the development of postwar “youth culture,” crediting young people for expanding
the paradigm of acceptable social and sexual relationships in the 1960s and 1970s.7 Looking at
France in particular, Michael Siedman identified a number of pivotal events during the late
1950s and early 1960s, including the slackening of university cohabitation policies, which helped
change social views and mores regarding sexuality. 8 Anne-Marie Sohn, meanwhile, saw the rise
of flirtation among 1960s teenagers, a byproduct of increased adolescent economic independence
and leisure, as a necessary step towards the greater prominence of sexual expression and
acceptance after 1968.9
The common thread in all of these works is their shared focus on the actions and attitudes
of the era’s young people, identifying them as key drivers behind the sexual revolution. A
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common tendency is to present the history of the sexual revolution in a linear fashion, a narrative
of steady gains. To frame the subject in this way, though, is to obscure the numerous instances of
resistance, both overt and subtle, to the liberalization of laws and social mores. The historian
Dagmar Herzog reminds us that “to tell only a narrative of gradual progress would be to
misunderstand how profoundly complicated sexual politics of the twentieth century in Europe
actually were.”10 Using this observation as a starting point, I want to place the yé-yé phenomenon
in its historical context, recognizing that it served to perpetuate a dominant culture of
conservatism regarding both sexuality and gender, and that, in doing so, counteracted nascent
expressions of sexuality found in popular literature and film from the preceding decade.
Several scholars have already begun to question yé-yé’s conservative outlook in relation
to changing attitudes about sexuality. Chris Tinker, in his case study of the magazine Salut les
copains, argues that the popular culture tacitly endorsed a model of heteronormative
relationships and with it a clear and unambiguous division of gender roles.11 Not until the early
1970s, he writes, did the magazine begin “to recognize alternatives to the male-female
relationships and the middle-class marriage model.”12 Jonathyne Briggs, meanwhile, offers a
careful analysis of how popular music performed by young women during the period generally
served to reinforce conventional gender norms and conservative views on sexuality, even if by
the mid-1960s these performers found subtle ways to “address sexual inequality [between men
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and women] and their own sexuality – albeit still often in indirect ways.”13 Along these lines, I
aim to demonstrate how the yé-yé popular culture did little, if anything, to disrupt popular
perceptions of marriage, family, and gender. Despite a historiography that privileges the role of
teenage popular culture as driver in the easing of social and sexual norms, the evidence presented
here serves to offer a more complex image.
The Marriage Ideal
As late as the mid-1960s, marriage still held a near-hegemonic place with regards to
representation in the popular media. The average age of marriage had fallen precipitously since
the end of World War II, reaching an apex in the 1960s before gradually creeping upwards again
from the 1970s onward.14 The phenomenon proved so conspicuous that it drew the attention of
journalists, like Madeleine Franck who, writing for Elle in 1963, penned several articles that
examining the trend of young marriages. Looking on skeptically, she surveyed a number of
young adults and the challenging decisions faced when deciding to marry young.15 For its part,
by contrast, the French state saw the marriage trends as an area of national strength. It could
brag, as it did in a 1959 governmental publication, that one out of four Frenchmen aged 24 years
or less were married, a number that had grown from only one out of twelve in 1900. As the
government saw it, the prevalence of marriage meant that the postwar generation, which was
“freer, more eager for life” than its forebears, felt confident in a newly stable and prosperous
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France.16 It also meant that these young people were ready to contribute to their country’s future
from a safe and secure marital foundation.
As the topic of young marriage gained attention elsewhere, the yé-yé popular culture
announced its own preoccupation with marriage. Songs, advertisements, and magazine articles
readily stressed the institution’s importance and its centrality to French society. In spite of the
gradual societal change in attitudes regarding social and sexual relationships, the leading
magazines and performers of yé-yé tenaciously clung to the marriage ideal as the principal, if not
the only, form of social organization between the sexes. In particular, teenage girls proved the
primary recipients of this emphasis on the marriage ideal. Advertisements targeted them; one, for
a Parisian wedding dress boutique, encouraged female readers to “realize the marriage of [their]
dreams.”17 Elsewhere, advice columns, purporting to educate, encouraged readers to think about
nuptials. The March 1965 issue of Mademoiselle âge tendre, for instance, prompted its teenage
audience to ask parents about marriage; “what conditions do I have to fulfill to be able to marry”
was the suggested wording.18 Similarly, journalists eagerly discussed the topic with the stars of
yé-yé. In particular, interviewers often questioned female performers about their thoughts on the
matter. Speaking with Michéle Torr in a 1965 issue of Salut les copains, for instance, an
interviewer asked if the singer ever thought about marriage. In her response, Torr tried to
navigate her own preferences, the realities of her profession, and societal expectations by
responding that “yes,” she thought about it, but that she wanted to delay it until “the latest
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possible” age – “upwards of thirty years old, maybe” – given that being a famed singer made
having a successful relationship difficult.19 As Torr’s testimony attested, the societal expectation
of marriage meant that, even in exceptional circumstances, it was not a question of if, but when.
Even popular songs confirmed the prevailing logic of marriage. In 1964, at the height of
her popularity, Sheila released Sheila 6e disque, an extended-play record containing the song “Un
jour, je me marierai” (“One day, I will marry”). As the lyrics went:
Like all the girls
I hope that one day I will encounter it
Oh yeah!
Like all the girls
I too dream that one day I will marry
Oh yeah!
Because soon he will come
The one who will say to me “for life, the two of us are united”
They often say “don’t be in too much of a hurry,
because to marry you have all the time”
Me, I agree but I believe that now
I can think about it from time to time
Because me, yes
I already see happy ones all around me
All my copains, all those that I really love
Two small boys will come to the church
To hold the long gown that I will wear20
Interestingly enough, the song was an adaptation of the US singer Brenda Lee’s 1964 single
“The Waiting Game.”21 But whereas Lee’s version sung vaguely about the teenage wait for true
love, Sheila’s variant featured rewritten lyrics focusing specifically on the act of marriage. Just
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as significant was the fact that the song came not from some obscure performer along the fringes
of yé-yé, but from one of the genre’s most prominent stars.
Though seemingly at odds with a society of increasing permissiveness and tolerance to
other forms of sexual relationship, the privileged status of marriage found in the yé-yé media and
among its performers mirrored international trends borne out of the postwar era. In the two
decades following World War II, people married in greater numbers and at younger ages than at
any time in recent memory. Not limited to France, similar phenomena were noted in the United
States, Britain, and Canada. But it was not just marriage that thrived, it was a particular kind of
marriage. Stephanie Coontz reminds us that, in all these countries, there was a striking “cultural
consensus” concerning the universality of marriage and the primacy of the “traditional,” male
breadwinner-led family unit.22 During the period, alternatives to this model were seldom
considered. The irony, of course, was that though it was labeled a traditional and age-old model,
this particular conception of marriage was quite unique to its time. In Western Europe, the
unwavering faith in this narrow view of marriage and family represented a search for stability in
the wake of the greatest bout of genocide and destruction the continent had even seen.23 The
onset of the Cold War and the general state of anxiety it produced also contributed to the
marriage ideal. In the US at least, as Elaine Tyler May argues, the self-contained nuclear family
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buttressed by marriage and domesticity offered safe harbor in an otherwise uncertain world.24 In
France, marriage provided a similar refuge to the anxieties of modern life.
Envisioning the Ideal Mother and Housewife
This societal search for stability in the two decades following World War II, expressed
through a heightened recourse to marriage, lent itself to idealized notions of domesticity, ones
that had implications concerning women’s roles both inside and outside the home. In this
context, marriage was practically inseparable from the larger notion of family; the former was
tacitly understood as the necessary requisite for the latter. Taken together, the concepts of
marriage and family evoked starkly defined and hardened gender roles, neatly delineated
between husband and wife. An entire regulatory discourse operated across mediums to ensure the
maintenance of these two opposing roles. For women, questions about family pointed directly to
their roles as mothers. The renewed societal appetite for domestic comfort, buoyed by France’s
expanding consumer economy, meanwhile heightened links between women as housewives and
homemakers. These two socially-defined roles, mother and housewife, were not mutually
exclusive and instead often served to reinforce one another. As such, the complimentary tandem
provided two dominant feminine ideals during the period. What made these idealized feminine
representations so powerful was their apparent naturalness. For its part, the yé-yé popular culture
contributed to this perception; journalists framed the gendered notion of marriage with an easy,
self-satisfying logic while the popular young stars did their best to play the part of the ideal
spouse.
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The convergence of mother and housewife was on full display in a 1965 article of
Mademoiselle âge tendre, which posed a question to its female readership: “Marriage, is it right
for you?”25 By answering the twenty questions that followed, the reader would apparently be
able to conclude whether marriage suited them or not. Many of the questions subtly suggested a
particular vision of marriage: “Are you touched by a crying baby?” “Do you like to do the
shopping for your mother?” “When your mother is ill, can you fill in for her around the house?”
“When your mother has friends come over, do you enjoy making the dinner courses?”26
Questions of this tone and nature left readers with little variety in what constituted the woman’s
contribution to marriage. While positioning itself as an objective survey between two legitimate
alternatives, its conclusion clearly revealed preference for one over the other. When readers
flipped to the back page to discover if, based on their responses, marriage suited them, they were
given their answer. If they answered “yes” to a majority of the questions, they were indeed fit for
marriage. “You know to do what is necessary when it is necessary; you are understanding,
helpful, maternal.” For those who answer in the negative, ill-suited for marriage, they were
evidently dynamic and independent. “But,” it continued, “have those close to you ever made it
clear to you that you have been a bit self-centered?”27 Framed in this way, the questionnaire
offered the appearance of neutrality while subtly exerting a form of prescriptive social policing
that left little room for deviation.
While the questionnaire spoke to women’s roles as both mothers and housewives, it is
nevertheless telling that the very first question, out of twenty, alluded to motherhood. It reflected
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a prevailing thought that tied women’s civic and political roles within society to their biological
capacity to reproduce. Since the nineteenth century, a number of political, religious, and medical
discourses intersected to avow women’s foremost place as mothers, portraying them as a
moralizing force within society, responsible for imparting upon future generations prescribed
social, civic, and religious values.28 Alongside popular thought, an entire legal and political
framework, starting with the Napoleonic Civil Code in 1804, emerged to limit women’s
participation in public life, therefore lending credence to the belief that women’s “natural” role
was as mothers within the domestic sphere.29 As such, long before women gained the right to
vote, their contribution to the nation came through the creation of new (hopefully more
populous) generations.
The strong linkage between women and motherhood stemmed partly from national fears
about tepid population growth and low fertility rates. Once the most populous nation in Europe,
France’s natality slowed in the second half of the nineteenth century; by the early twentieth
century its population count had been surpassed by hostile neighboring countries. The
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conventional wisdom of the period suggested that national strength, both economic and military,
was tied directly to population numbers. As such, a lengthy process of depopulation proved
cause for national anxiety.30 The bloodletting of the First World War brought existing fears about
French depopulation to a fever pitch. In the war’s aftermath, the conservative French National
Assembly deemed it prudent to intervene into the sexual lives of French citizens, culminating in
a number of pro-natal strategies, including stringent law in defense of procreation.31 It also
turned to a number of policies meant to encourage higher birthrates, including the creation of
robust social benefits as well as symbolic gestures that celebrated motherhood.32 Despite failing
to meet its intended goal of increasing national fertility, portions of the laws prohibiting
contraceptives were later codified into the Public Health Code under the postwar Fourth
Republic, reaffirming the state’s commitment to increasing France’s birth rates.33 Despite
mounting pressure for revision from the 1950s onward, the law remained in effect well into the
1960s; contraceptives were only partially legalized with the passage of the Neuwirth law in
December 1967.34
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The attitudes on display in the yé-yé discourse, however far removed from the centurylong politics of motherhood, were nevertheless products of this historical legacy. To be sure, the
yé-yé media generally avoided discussion of questions of a sexual and political nature. This is not
completely surprising, given that the yé-yé popular culture’s (ostensible) purpose was to
entertain, to say nothing of the fact that its primary audience consisted of adolescents ineligible
to vote on such matters. Still, it was precisely because yé-yé appeared apolitical that the cultural
assumptions it advanced carried weight – they were treated not as contested political views but
as simple reflections of nature.
Many of the most famous stars of yé-yé confirmed these feminine ideals, either directly in
interviews or indirectly through their depiction in entertainment stories. The singer France Gall,
in the introductory issue of the youth magazine Formidable, confessed that “like all the girls” her
age, she waited for “prince charming.” “I would like to have two or three children,” she added,
noting that “as soon as their birth, I will abandon [my professional career] forever.”35 More
vaguely, Sylvie Vartan, noted once that, if she was unable to reconcile her professional and
personal lives and had to choose one, she would “opt for the private life, for marriage.”36 It was
precisely this attitude that garnered favor elsewhere in the media. In an article appearing in a
1963 issue of Age tendre et tête de bois, two music critics sparred over which singer was better,
Françoise Hardy or Vartan. The singers were the two most celebrated chanteuses in all of yé-yé
and, as such, the critics debated their merits. Though seemingly unrelated to her capacity to
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perform music, the critic arguing in Vartan’s favor, Michèle Ribaud, averred that, unlike the
independent Hardy, it was one of Sylvie’s charms that she could “admit that she is capable of
abandoning her career to establish a home and have children."37 On numerous occasions, the yéyé media offered a romantic view of the family ideal. But it was not only the youth press that
linked the stars of yé-yé to the prevailing conception of family in postwar France.
Adult-oriented magazines likewise seized opportunities to cast yé-yé singers in a
domestic context. The popular women’s magazine Elle ran a story in its July 1963 issue
spotlighting Michèle Anthony, the wife of the yé-yé singer Richard Anthony.38 The article no
doubt sought to satisfy the public’s appetite for information about the private lives of the famous.
But instead of painting the picture of an exceptional lifestyle, the article stressed Madame
Anthony’s normalness in spite of her husband’s unique career. Immediately, the journalist
characterizes Madame Anthony as a demure housewife, eager to stay out of the spotlight and
reluctant to be the article’s main focus. The journalist describes the Anthonys’ house, a domicile
far removed from her expectations, and the sight of Madame Anthony’s arrival at the foot of the
staircase. She was, as the journalist described her, the “perfect lady of the house.” As the
conscientious host, Madame Anthony promptly laid out a pristine table setting and served her
guest a warm beverage. Enjoying the arrangement, the author of the article deemed it “the
bourgeoisie at tea-time.”39 In short, she was the ideal housewife. Equally suggestive was the
inclusion of several photographs demonstrating Madame Anthony’s motherly bona fides. In one
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photo, she laid in the grass, accompanied by her husband, their two young children, and the
family dog. In it the two parents looked towards their children lovingly, a harmonious nuclear
family. In another, Madame Anthony was depicted delicately feeding her children.40 Capturing
her at the most banal moments of the day, the article demystified the life of the celebrity wife
while simultaneously affirming the universality of the housewife-mother ideal.
In a 1965 issue, the magazine Mademoiselle âge tendre provided a roundtable-type
discussion that prompted six famous young women to offer their thoughts on marriage. Among
them, four were musical performers (Sylvie Vartan, Françoise Hardy, Gillian Hills, and
Marianne Faithfull), one an Olympic swimmer (Christine Caron), and the other a champion
Alpine skier (Annie Famose).41 Among other questions, the magazine asked the contributors
whether marriage was a necessity and what constituted the ideal husband and the ideal wife. All
of the participants, save for Françoise Hardy, deemed marriage a necessity.42 The occasion
provided the opportunity to affirm existing perceptions of the feminine ideal. Several
respondents conjured the image of the modest housewife and doting mother as the model spouse.
Caron, the Olympic swimmer, responded that “the ideal spouse is …. a girl capable of sewing,
ironing, and cooking,” all while maintaining a smiling visage and a gay and coquettish
demeanor. Understanding the unlikely reality of this ideal, Caron jokingly continued, “alas, I am
not yet fit to marry.”43 In the same discussion, Vartan defined the ideal wife more plainly. She
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concluded that “a girl who is going to marry must think foremost to two things: does she know
how to keep [up] a house? Will she know how to take care of infants who might come?”44
As the above evidence suggests, the roles of mother and housewife often went hand in
hand. Still, there were numerous occasions when the topic of children remained absent from
discussion. Even without mention of children, though, the feminine ideal espoused in the yé-yé
media still remained firmly rooted in the domestic sphere. The female stars of yé-yé were often
expected to display the requisite qualities of being a housewife. Early in an interview with Sylvie
Vartan, for instance, a journalist asked: “I would like to know if you have any household talents,
if for example one could count on you to make an omelet.” The journalist, Raymond Mouly,
continued, noting that he finds that “almost all of the female singers (chanteuses) have a little
specialty that brings joy to their copains and to journalists.”45 Somewhat defensively, Vartan
replied that she helped her mother “sweep up and run the vacuum cleaner, that’s all.” Vartan,
whose family emigrated from Bulgaria when she was eight years old, felt the need to explain her
lack of further domestic knowhow. The rigors of learning the language consumed her energies:
“At the age where I would have been able to learn cooking and sewing, like a lot of young girls
do, I was a student completely absorbed by my studies,” she responded, reminding the
interviewer of her Bulgarian origins.46 Michèle Torr, interviewed in Salut les copains, was asked
similar questions. The interviewer inquired whether the young singer knew how to sew and
whether she could cook. Torr confessed that, while she had general knowledge in both, she was
not particularly adept at either. It was in this same interview, already discussed earlier in the
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chapter, where Torr acknowledged her desire to delay marriage. In the following month’s issue,
a male reader wrote to the editor with a bit of sardonic advice. “Michèle Torr has good reason to
want to marry as late as possible,” he wrote. “She isn’t sure how to sew a dress, she doesn’t like
to cook, and cites sleeping as her favorite distraction. Therefore guys, you’ve understood, if you
nab Michèle, first get yourself a housemaid.”47
While female domesticity had its roots in a nineteenth century bourgeois conception of
privacy, the housewife envisioned in the descriptions above was a product of France’s postwar
experience. The Second World War threw the conception of “home” into turmoil, exacerbating
existing shortcomings in housing that had plagued France since the nineteenth century.48 The
historian W. Brian Newsome estimates that France lost over two million structures as a result of
the war.49 The conflict left millions of families without adequate living accommodations. As
national recovery commenced, housing became not only a site of reconstruction, but also of
France’s modernization efforts. Though rebuilding efforts launched at a slower rate than
anticipated, by the mid-1950s the pace had great increased, reaching some 270,000 new housing
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units per annum by 1957.50 With the building of new housing came an increased appetite for
domestic comforts from a population that had weathered a lengthy period of economic and
material hardship. First came increased access to basic comforts, like clean running water, as
well as indoor toilets, showers, and bathtubs.51 Second, the expansion of France’s economy
availed the purchase of consumer durables that similarly spelled comfort within the home.
Appliances like the refrigerator and the washing machine became symbols of a
modernized household, distancing French citizens from the memory of war and penury. The new
home, replete with sophisticated consumer products, was symptomatic of France’s larger
modernization efforts, and whereas a new educated class of salaried, technocratic employees
emerged to manage an increasingly technological and corporate postwar economy, women
increasingly became seen as managers of the new household.52 Adam C. Stanley argues that an
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ideology linking women to the “modern,” appliance-equipped home began in the interwar years
at a time when actual ownership of domestic appliances was scant.53 In the postwar period,
discourse, imbued with an ideology of productivity and efficiency, linked women to the
household further. Popular women’s magazines like Elle and Marie-Claire endeavored to
educate their female readership, teaching them how to manage their homes in an efficient and
orderly manner. Sharing the same mindset, domestic science courses prepared school-age girls to
assume their eventual roles as productive, knowledgeable housewives.54 The contradiction, of
course, was that for many working-class and lower middle-class families, two incomes were
required in order to afford the modern appliances.55 As such, with the rise of an expanding
consumer economy in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of two-income families in France duly
rose. Still, despite an increasing need for women in the workplace, both state taxation policies
and public opinion served to dissuade the participation of married women in the workforce well
into the 1960s.56 As late as 1963, 82% of the population thought that a married woman’s place
was in the home.57
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Containing Youth Sexuality
As a dominant signifier of femininity, though, the mother-housewife had its rivals. In
particular, the image of the young, independent girl provided a contrasting symbol to the tenets
of motherhood and marriage. As depicted in popular media, the young girl often evoked, for
good or for bad, visions of modernity. A potent early incarnation of the modern girl was the
garçonne, a figure that entered the French cultural imagination in the 1920s. Featuring a short
skirt, a bobbed haircut, and a casual attitude towards sexuality, the garçonne seemed to flout
conservative societal norms. For observers, the garçonne, whether real or imagined, seemed to
represent the myriad disruptions to the bourgeois social order in the aftermath of World War I.58
In the 1950s a new image of youthful femininity appeared, conjured into being by popular works
in film, literature, and advertisements. With these various works, a whole constellation of
cultural signifiers emerged to lend coherence to a specific view of youthful femininity that, while
different from the 1920s variant, nevertheless shared the apparent sexual promiscuity and
subversive independence of its forebear. A representative example of this ascendant view of
adolescent femininity was on full display in the 1954 novel Bonjour tristesse (Hello, sadness).
Written by Françoise Sagan, who was herself not yet twenty years old, the novel centered around
the teenage lead Cécile, a character defined by her sharp cynicism, manipulative behavior, and
unburdened sexual urges. The book was an immediate, if controversial, success, selling over one
million copies in France alone and winning a prestigious literary award in the year of its release.
Its popularity nevertheless offered for some observers an uncomfortable image of teenage
independence exercising resistance to a patriarchal bourgeois order through sexual means and a
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disregard for parental authority. The fact that the story came from the mind of a young girl made
the anxiety all the more acute.59
While Bonjour tristesse became an obvious point of reference for the new, sexuallycharged and independent femininity, no single person or cultural product came to define this
postwar image more than the actress and fashion model Brigitte Bardot. Between 1952 and 1965,
she cemented her reputation as one of the most recognizable international celebrities, appearing
in nearly forty films and gracing the pages of innumerable magazines and tabloids during that
span. Thanks to an insatiable interest from paparazzi, Bardot received more coverage in the press
than even the French president, Charles de Gaulle.60 Throughout, she exuded a cool and
confident demeanor, outfitted in occasionally skimpy but always stylish ready-to-wear clothing
alongside an effortlessly unkempt coiffure. It was a look eagerly emulated by millions of girls. In
the process, she staked her claim as the first bona fide postwar sex symbol thanks to her sultry
appearances in numerous films, like Roger Vadim’s 1956 Et Dieu … créa la femme (And God
created Woman), where she comfortably flaunted her nude body onscreen for viewers’ titillation.
Her off-screen persona followed similar lines, with the media routinely sexualizing her image.
What made Bardot so seemingly scandalous, though, was not only her comfortable expressions
of sexual desire, it was also her unencumbered sexual aggressiveness. Her willing pursuit of
male counterparts in search of her own sexual gratification, whether on-screen or off, appeared to
subvert the gendered order of society, in which women were expected to be demure and
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unassertive, waiting patiently for male attention.61 It was ultimately Bardot’s rejection of societal
expectations regarding femininity that made her so simultaneously alluring and scandalous. 62
With the rise of the yé-yé in the 1960s, the dominant image of youthful femininity
underwent a subtle change. The casual sexuality displayed by Bardot and others was rebuked in
favor of a more contained, conservative outlook. Emblematic of this shifting attitude was an
article in the first issue of Age tendre et tête de bois. In an article, the journalist Naej Yruam
excoriated Bardot, as the reigning sex symbol of the era, for crafting an unsuitable image for
young people.63 To begin the article, the journalist looked back nostalgically to Bardot's early
career, when she was the so-called “Marianne of our youth” and the “petite princess of the 20th
century.” A number of controversies swiftly sullied this wholesome image. “But suddenly, alas,”
Yruam continued, “marriage, divorces, suicide [attempts], and above all films restricted to teens
younger than 18.”64 To make the case that this view was not held by the author alone, the article
included a number of brief responses from teenagers. Some understood the celebrity’s decisions.
Others, however, echoed the author's argument. One, an eighteen year old factory worker
remarked that Bardot had “betrayed” young people with her regrettable actions. Another, a
teenage girl, opined that young people needed a soft, agreeable, and intelligent girl to serve as a
role model to young people. At one time Bardot met that criteria, the girl continued, but "it's true
that she disappointed me."65
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With the rejection of the sexualized image of Bardot, the yé-yé phenomenon began
crafting its own image of youthful femininity in the form of the copine. The copine – the
idealized female adherent of yé-yé – retained some hallmarks from its 1950s predecessors,
adopting the carefree and independent spirit as well as the gratification through personal
pleasure. But whereas the pursuit of pleasure was expressed in sexual terms by earlier icons like
Bardot, the copines channeled it in different ways, redirecting it from sexuality and towards
consumption and leisure. In the process, the concept of youthful femininity became contained;
no longer did it stand in stark contrast to the domesticity of the mouther-housewife ideal. Instead,
it became a prelude to it, a brief window of time where an adolescent girl can enjoy her
frivolities before assuming her ordained role within the home.66
The teen magazine Formidable reflected as much in a lengthy examination of “the girls
[of] ‘66.”67 Immediately, the article reveled in the fact that the “typical” girl in 1966 would
pursue her driver’s examinations with an eye towards eventual automobile ownership. The girl of
1966 wore the latest fashions, had money to spend, and was highly sociable. She could go out
several evenings per week and she could remark freely about the trivialities of teenage romance.
Taken together, the article suggested that the modern girl was an independent, fun-loving, and
carefree consumer. Before concluding, though, the article felt it necessary to remind its readers
that, though these teens knew how to have fun, they still “contemplate marriage with much
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seriousness.”68 Intending to marry between 20 and 22 years old, these girls would soon be the
“perfect spouses.” The following quotation from a young respondent made it clear what this
meant: for her future husband, the girl quoted promised that she “will make all his favorite
meals.”69 As such, the girls, while enjoying the pleasures of youth, still looked forward to a
lifetime as loyal spouses.
Well into the 1960s, the yé-yé popular culture offered a singular vision of marriage and
family. Popular female singers and journalists affirmed the importance of marriage and roles of
mothers and housewives within it. Throughout, magazines, songs, and other sources collectively
operated to define adolescence in relation to the feminine domestic ideal. While they could have
fun, they were expected to nevertheless envision the future, aligning their expectations with
those of a society that still deemed women’s foremost role within the household. Even with the
emergence of expressions of sexuality outside of marriage, on display in works like Bonjour
tristesse and the films of Brigitte Bardot, the major influences of yé-yé continued to echo
dominant notions of gender and sexuality emblematic of the early postwar period. When, in the
late 1960s, young people began to challenge the conservative outlook on sexuality and gender,
they likewise rejected the assumptions upheld by the stars and media of yé-yé. As the epilogue
suggests, the popular resonance of yé-yé amongst young people, so prevalent in the middle of the
1960s, correspondingly declined in accordance with changing tastes and attitudes.

68
69

Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 26.

121

EPILOQUE: THE DECLINE OF YÉ-YÉ, 1966-1968
In May 1968, the whole of France was brought to a screeching halt. What started out as a
campus protest at a university on the outskirts of Paris had escalated by month’s end to a
nationwide general strike that joined students and workers, both disillusioned by France’s
modernization efforts, in a common cause to refashion French society. Workers occupied
factories while the university students seized control of campuses. Leftist organizations staged
massive marches, and students clashed with police, forming cobblestone barricades and
placarding Paris with inventive graffiti and posters. For the discontented students, the events of
May proved a cathartic revolt against a system that had reserved a vital role for them but allowed
them no voice. Their ambitious agenda included education reform, heightened sexual freedoms,
and more political participation, as well as a general rejection of what they saw as an
increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic society of consumption under the heavy hand of
Gaullism. While the music and of yé-yé was not caught directly in the fray, it was nevertheless
an integral part of the system that felt so stifling for so many young people. The protestors’
impassioned lament of “consumer society” certainly included a yé-yé popular culture which had
gone to such lengths to celebrate France’s consumerist aspirations.1
The protests of May 1968 were not the first signs of a fading yé-yé popular culture, but
rather the final pronounced denouement of a gradual decline that began several years earlier. The
rise of the folk singer Antoine, who burst onto the French music scene in 1966, and his
subsequent rift with Johnny Hallyday, yé-yé’s reigning king, was a pronounced example of the
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changing direction of French popular music. From the start, he cultivated an image built in
opposition to the wholesome copains of yé-yé. Whereas, by 1965, Johnny Hallyday (the
preeminent yé-yé teen idol) had adopted a respectably clean-cut middle class persona, Antoine
offered a rebellious bohemian image more befitting Haight-Ashbury than the Left Bank of Paris.2
Antoine’s self-titled debut album, released in early 1966, featured the singer crouched with
acoustic guitar in hand, his shoulder-length hair falling on a flowery shirt. His biggest hit from
the album, “Les Elucubrations D’Antoine” (“The Rantings of Antoine”), stirred controversy with
its flippant lyrics laced with sarcasm.3 Aside from mentioning the singer’s preference for long
hair and flower-print shirts, it also touched on social issues: its final verse recounted a fictional
conversation with President de Gaulle who asked the singer what he would do to improve the
country. His response: “Put the [birth control] pill on sale in the [retail store] Monoprix.”4 The
lyrics celebrated newness and change. As one verse read: “Everything should change all the
time/ The world would be much more amusing/ We would see planes in the metro corridors/ And
Johnny Hallyday in a cage at [the] Médrano [Circus].”5 Mocking the most popular yé-yé singer
underscored Antoine’s bid to differentiate himself. Hallyday responded to the public slight with a
song of his own, titled “Cheveux Longs et Idées Courtes” (“Long Hair and Short on Ideas”),
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which mocked the self-righteousness and self-aggrandizement of Antoine and others.6 His image
changed too, as by late 1966 he had long sideburns and shaggy hair, but it was too little too late.7
A New York Times article, highlighting the feud between Antoine and Hallyday,
recognized the changing shift in popular tastes. Hallyday, the article found, was “a young man
with long hair which may not be quite long enough.”8 “His elders viewed him as a smoldering
rebel” the article continued, “but can it be that, at the ripe age of 23, he has become bourgeois?”
The two singers personified the larger gulf between the apolitical conservatism of yé-yé and the
newer musical trends shaped by a yearning for political expression. “The Antoine enthusiasts
have made it very clear that they consider Hallyday passé, bourgeois, someone who has nothing
to say. On the other hand, Hallyday and his fans believe that Antoine represents a trend toward a
new femininity in men.”9 The difference, the article noted, came down to the fact that Hallyday
played uncomplicated rock and roll while Antoine “clicks with songs about current events,”
which included birth control, the Vietnam War, and racism. It was clear that Antoine, with his
“rambling songs of protest,” had become the new trendsetter.10
The sensations caused by Antoine were symptomatic of a larger transformation. For one,
the popular music press changed, becoming more fragmented. For the first half of the decade, the
majority of the magazines collectively affirmed, in one way or another, the copain culture. Over
the second half of the decade, a number of new music magazines emerged. Unlike the magazines
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of yé-yé, which contented themselves following teen idols and celebrating adolescent fun, these
new periodicals struck a more intellectual and analytical tone. First came Rock & Folk in 1966,
then Beat in 1968, and finally Actuel in 1970.11 By the late 1960s, there remained only vestiges
of the once prominent musical phenomenon. Many of the teen music magazines dated from the
yé-yé years between 1962 and 1966 folded; only Salut les copains and its sister publication
Mademoiselle âge tendre, not coincidently both under the capable direction of Daniel Filipacchi,
continued into the 1970s. At the same time, many of the teen idols who found fame during the
yé-yé phenomenon’s height struggled to adapt. Of the popular singers, only the biggest stars to
emerge from the genre, like Françoise Hardy and Sylvie Vartan, proved able to sustain success
late into their careers. They did so, however, by transcending the yé-yé image and sound. Others,
like Claude François and Sheila, reinvented themselves by riding the next wave in French
popular music, disco.
Though the decline was gradual, by 1968 the yé-yé popular culture proved out of step
with the young people it had long claimed to reflect. This was made abundantly clear amid the
protests of May. The collective silence from the phenomenon’s major voices – teen idols and
magazines – on the topic spoke volumes. A June 1968 issue of the magazine Noir et blanc
interviewed a number of teen idols to determine “what they think of the young people’s
‘revolution.’”12 Most, like Johnny Hallyday and Sheila, proved evasive, refusing to offer a clear
opinion. Françoise Hardy, perceived to be the most cerebral of the yé-yé teen idols, responded
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that she was “neither a suffragette nor a militant” and refused to take a public position.13 Some
went even further. France Gall noted that what had started out as “a certain irritation” eventually
escalated to a level that scared her. “But today,” she continued, “I am completely reassured.
Everything has returned to order. What happiness!”14 Frank Alamo went so far as to say that
“fortunately,” after all of the commotion, “General de Gaulle has proven himself up to the task.
He was the strongest and he showed it.”15 The presse des jeunes reacted similarly. The July 1968
issue of Salut les copains, for instance, featured no mention of the near-revolution the month
prior. It contented itself with coverage of Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan’s tour and vacation
of South America and Claude François’ travels to Africa.16 In the May issue, meanwhile, only
André Arnaud, the magazine’s resident news and opinion columnist, mentioned the nationwide
protests. His column featured a certain level of sympathy for the plight of the student protesters,
but Arnaud made sure to couple it with admonishment for the “agitators” whose only aim, he
averred, was to cause chaos. Throughout the article, Arnaud sternly reminded his readers that a
noble goal is easily corrupted by vandalism and ill-directed anger.17
In an analysis the following year, the sociologist and social commentator Edgar Morin
found that the rise of mass culture and mass consumption in a society of leisure and affluence
allowed for the creation of two distinct categories of youth. On the “right wing” he identified a
youth culture that was “almost entirely integrated and integrationist, with its cult of the stars (fan
clubs, autographed photos, almost total absence of dissonance)” typified by the yé-yé popular
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culture. Among the “left wing,” Morin observed a youth culture where “consummation took
priority over consumption, where one is very close to violence, to marijuana, to LSD, to the
denunciation of official values, to political contestation.”18
What was the legacy of yé-yé? Certainly, from a musical standpoint, its enduring impact
was limited; it never gained the critical praise that other genres like jazz or the chanson
française, did, and it was only once popular music musicians began crafting songs in contrast to
the “mainstream” yé-yé sound that the Anglo-American musical style gained a legitimacy of its
own in France.19 The genre nevertheless deserves credit for adapting American-influenced
popular musical styles into an original French alternative. As this thesis has suggested all along,
though, yé-yé’s impact extended far beyond its musical contributions. Through its sheer
magnitude and popularity, the popular culture found itself well-positioned to define what it
meant to be young in mid-1960s France, and in doing so offered a cohesive image of
adolescence that fully embraced the broader goals of a decolonized France.
Taken further, in defining youth, the popular culture also, on some level, articulated a
vision of modern France. It accepted, if tacitly, the imperatives of economic and cultural
modernization that preoccupied the intellectual and political elite of the era. Yé-yé provided a
rational portrait of France’s transformation into a mass consumer society, one that, if its
popularity was any indication, enjoyed a level of legitimacy and consensus. Its widespread
acceptance marked a departure from the era of the blousons noirs only a few short years prior,
when the idea of youth consumerism stoked exaggerated fears about the erosion of France’s
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identity amid the twin threats of modernization and “Americanization.” At the same time, the
archetypical copain, as defined discursively, implied both an urban and increasingly educated
existence as integral to the modern adolescent experience. Such a representation lent a cultural
coherence to the social and economic changes underway at the time. It reflected the
democratization and expansion of secondary and higher education, an undertaking deemed vital
to France’s modernization efforts and its thrust towards swift technological advancement.
Finally, if popular media representations were any indication, the copain culture also suggested
an inherent whiteness, lending the appearance of (racial and ethnic) unity in the definition of
“Frenchness” in the wake of decolonization, a definition that obscured France’s complex racial
makeup and put the appearance of distance between “modern” France and its imperial past.
Though the yé-yé phenomenon never had any direct affinity with the ruling Gaullists, it
was nevertheless a product of the climate of conservatism and stability engendered by de Gaulle
and his contemporaries. Coming on the heels of an half century of uninterrupted crises (two
world wars followed by a succession of colonial wars, periods of economic hardship as well as
social and political turmoil), by the early 1960s the French public placed a premium on stability.
Yé-yé helped serve that need, coupling its consumerist outlook with an apolitical social
conservatism that emphasized traditional gender roles and sexual relationships. The popular
culture helped usher in a period where the French public, unburdened by any major internal or
external crisis, could enjoy the fruits of national prosperity. It was only once France became
“bored,” to quote a prescient Le Monde article from spring 1968, that the world envisioned by
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yé-yé lost its allure.20 For a baby boomer generation who had never known anything other than
affluence and abundance, yé-yé’s promotion of apolitical leisure and consumption was no longer
enough. Like de Gaulle, the popular music was deemed too conservative and too out of touch
with the needs of France’s young generation. Their vociferous, if ultimately unrealized, rejection
of what France had become – namely, a nation that had over a relatively brief span of time
undergone a consumer revolution buttressed by far-reaching economic and technological change,
while abandoning a global empire in favor of a strictly defined border on the European continent,
all under de Gaulle’s paternalistic stewardship – underscored just how much France had changed
(or was perceived to have changed). The yé-yé popular culture was vital to that perceived
change, articulating a vision of modern France and youth’s role in it.
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